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Abstract  
Dramatic declines in capital tax rates among U.S. states and European countries have been linked 
by many commentators to tax competition and an inevitable “race to the bottom.”  This paper 
provides an empirical analysis of the reaction of capital tax policy in a given U.S. state to 
changes in capital tax policy by other states.  The analysis is undertaken with a novel panel 
dataset covering the 48 contiguous U.S. states for the period 1965 to 2006 and is guided by the 
theory of strategic tax competition.  The latter suggests that capital tax policy is a function of 
“foreign” (out-of-state) tax policy, home state and foreign state economic and demographic 
conditions and, perhaps most importantly, preferences for government services.  We estimate 
this reaction function for the two primary business tax policies employed by states:  the 
investment tax credit rate and the corporate income tax rate.  The slope of the reaction function – 
the equilibrium response of home state to foreign state tax policy – is negative, contrary to many 
prior empirical studies of fiscal reaction functions.  This seemingly paradoxical result is due to 
two critical elements – controlling for aggregate shocks and allowing for delayed responses to 
foreign tax changes.  Omitting either of these elements leads to a misspecified model and a 
positively sloped reaction function.  Our results suggest that the secular decline in capital tax 
rates, at least among U.S. states, reflects synchronous responses among states to common shocks 
rather than competitive responses to foreign state tax policy.  While striking given prior findings 
in the literature, these results are not surprising.  The negative sign is fully consistent with 
qualitative and quantitative implications of the theoretical model developed in this paper.  Rather 
than “racing to the bottom,” our findings suggest that states are “riding on a seesaw.” 
 
Keywords:  Tax Competition, State Taxation, Reaction Functions, Capital Taxation  
 
JEL Codes:  H71, H77, H25 
 
Corresponding Author              
Robert S. Chirinko      Daniel J. Wilson 
Department of Finance      Research Department 
University of Illinois at Chicago      Federal Reserve Bank of 
2333 University Hall         San Francisco 
601 South Morgan (MC 168)      101 Market Street 
Chicago, Illinois  60607-7121      San Francisco, CA  94105 
PH:  312 355 1262      PH:  415 974 3423 
FX:  312 413 7948      FX:  415 974 2168 
EM: Chirinko@uic.edu      EM: Daniel.Wilson@sf.frb.org    
Tax Competition Among U.S. States: 
Racing to the Bottom or Riding on a Seesaw? 





II.  The Tax Reaction Function: Theoretical Underpinnings And Empirical Implications 
    A.  A Model Of Tax Competition 
    B.  Empirical Implications  
 
III. Estimation  Issues 
    A.  The Estimating Equation 
    B.  The Common Correlated Effects (CCE) Estimator 
    C.  Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables 
    D.  The General Specification And Implementation 
 
IV.  U.S. State-Level Panel Data  
    A.  Capital Tax Policy () 
    B.  Control Variables (x) 
C.  Foreign (Out-Of-State) Variables (
ff ,x  ) 
    D.  Candidate Instruments (z) 
 
V. Empirical  Results   
    A.  Baseline Results     
  B.    Robustness 
  C.    Extensions 
 
VI.  Comparison To Previous Empirical Studies 
 
VII.  Summary And Conclusions 
 
Appendix A:  Variable Definitions And Data Sources 
 
  Appendix B:  Analytic Details – Properties Of The Capital Mobility Function And 
                                   The Existence Of An Equilibrium Tax Rate,  *   
 






 Figures      
Tax Competition Among U.S. States: 
Racing to the Bottom or Riding on a Seesaw? 
 
Wisconsin is open for business.   In these challenging economic times 
while Illinois is raising taxes, we are lowering them.   
 
            Governor Scott Walker of Wisconsin (January 12, 2011) 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
This paper provides an empirical analysis of an important element in the theory of 
strategic tax competition, the reaction of capital tax policy in a given jurisdiction to changes in 
capital tax policy by neighboring jurisdictions.  The analysis is motivated in part by the dramatic 
decline among industrialized countries in capital tax rates over the past few decades.  There has 
been much debate over what factors are causing this decline and, in particular, how much of it is 
due to competition among jurisdictions.  A number of cross-country empirical studies have 
attempted to identify the causes, but this research is hampered by the substantial heterogeneity 
across countries in institutions, regulations, and business environments that weigh heavily on tax 
policy and impede capital flows.  U.S. states provide an ideal laboratory for investigating the 
determination of capital tax rates and the role of tax competition because, while states have much 
latitude for setting their own capital tax policies that, in fact, differ greatly among states, they 
share many important institutional and environmental factors in common.  Moreover, the general 
downward trend in capital taxation observed among industrialized countries in recent decades 
has also been observed among U.S. states.     
This trend among states can be seen in Figures 1 through 4, which show the major state 
capital tax policies in terms of national averages of tax variables from 1969 to 2006.  In 1968, no 
state had an investment tax credit (ITC).  Since then, as shown in Figure 1, ITC adoptions have 
grown steadily; by 2006, 24 states have or have had an ITC, and the average rate among states 
with an ITC has risen considerably to over 4%.  Figure 2 displays the average ITC and corporate 
income tax (CIT) rates over all states.  The national average ITC rate has increased in a nearly 
monotonic fashion and reaches nearly 2.0% by the end of the period.  While the average CIT rate   
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increased from the beginning of the period until 1991, it has fallen moderately since then.  The 
impact of these two tax variables on the incentive to acquire capital can be measured by the tax 
wedge on capital (TWC), which is the tax component of the user cost of capital.
1  Figure 3 
documents that the average TWC has fallen in recent years.  This pattern is confirmed by two 
additional tax series displayed in Figure 4.  The capital apportionment weight (CAW) is the 
weight on capital in a state’s formula for apportioning national corporate income to the state; 
similar to a lower CIT rate, a lower CAW provides an incentive to locate capital in the state.  The 
average CAW series has fallen sharply, declining by approximately 10 percentage points.  An 
alternative perspective on capital tax policy is provided by the average corporate tax (ACT) rate, 
defined as the ratio of corporate tax revenues to corporate income.  As shown in Figure 4, the 
average ACT peaked in 1980.  Since then, this procyclical series has drifted downward.  Viewed 
from a variety of perspectives, state capital taxation has changed dramatically in recent years and 
has become more “business friendly.”  These aggregate movements, buttressed with anecdotal 
observations and past empirical studies, suggest to many observers that states are engaged in a 
“race to the bottom.”   
The empirical results in this paper challenge that conclusion.  We find that the slope of 
the reaction function – the equilibrium response of home state tax policy to foreign state tax 
policy – is negative.   This result – consistent with the quotation above from the Governor of 
Wisconsin – runs contrary to the casual empirical evidence in Figures 1 through 4, the findings 
in many prior empirical results, and the implications of some theoretical models.  We document 
that this seeming paradox is due to two critical elements omitted in most prior empirical studies.  
First, aggregate shocks affecting all states create common incentives that lead states to act 
synchronously.  Absent proper conditioning for aggregate shocks, a positive slope of the reaction 
function is obtained with our data.  Second, in theory, tax competition is driven by capital 
mobility among states, but the flow of capital is not instantaneous, instead occurring over several 
years.  A properly specified model needs to allow for lagged responses.  In our data, static 
models also generate a positively sloped reaction function.  When we condition on aggregate 
shocks and allow for delayed responses, we find that the tax reaction function is negatively 
                                                 
1 The TWC series equals [(1-ITC-CIT*TD) / (1-CIT)] – 1.0, where TD is the present value of tax 
depreciation allowances and ITC and CIT reflect only state taxes.  See Appendix A for details.   
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sloped.   
While this result is striking, it is not surprising and is fully consistent with the qualitative 
and quantitative implications of the theoretical model developed in this paper.  Our findings 
suggest that the dramatic declines in state capital taxation in recent decades are not driven by tax 
competition among states, but rather from aggregate shocks (e.g., energy prices, U.S. 
macroeconomic conditions, tax rates and input costs abroad) impacting all states in more or less 
the same manner.  Rather than states “racing to the bottom” (a competitive response of tax rates 
in the same direction), our results suggest that state tax competition is better characterized by 
states “riding on a seesaw” (a competitive response in the opposite direction).  
Whether states are “racing to the bottom” or “riding on a seesaw” is important in current 
policy debates, both in the U.S. and abroad.  Many analysts and policymakers point to the secular 
decline in marginal and average capital tax rates (documented in Figures 1 to 4) as proof that 
states are engaged in a harmful race to the bottom necessitating federal legislation or judicial 
action.  For instance, a 2006 Supreme Court case, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, centered on whether 
state investment tax credits are a form of harmful tax competition and could run afoul of the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
2  The U.S. Congress has considered several bills that 
would alter states’ capacity to set various capital tax policies independently.  In recent years, 
states have joined together to form multi-state tax commissions that have recommended various 
coordination/harmonization measures aimed at preventing tax competition, though lack of 
enforcement has hampered their effectiveness. 
State business taxes and their implications for tax competition are also relevant for 
current policy debates in Europe.
3  As mentioned above, corporate tax rates among OECD 
countries also have declined sharply over the past two or three decades (Devereux, Rodoano, and 
Lockwood, 2008, Figure 1; U.S. Treasury, 2007, Chart 5.1).  This has led to deliberations among 
                                                 
2 The U.S. Commerce Clause states that “The Congress shall have Power … To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; …” (United States Constitution, 
1787, article I, section 8).  See Enrich (1997) and Stark and Wilson (2006) for discussions of the 
Commerce Clause and its relation to tax policy. 
 
3 The restrictions in the U.S. Commerce Clause are echoed in the Treaty of Rome section on Aids Granted 
by States: “Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, 
be incompatible with the common market” (Article 87).    
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European Union (EU) officials over whether to impose tax harmonization measures (McLure, 
2008).  As intra-union capital mobility rises toward levels approaching that among U.S. states, 
the U.S. experience may help inform the EU debate.  Our results based on U.S. states suggest 
that policies aimed at restricting tax competition as a means of stemming the tide of declining 
capital taxation are likely to be ineffective.  If aggregate shocks, and not tax competition, are 
driving the secular movements in capital taxation, the elimination of tax competition will do little 
to stop or reverse these trends. 
Our paper proceeds as follows.  Section II develops a theoretical model whose key 
element is the relative preference for private vs. public goods.   We show that the sign of the 
slope of the reaction function of home state to foreign state tax policy depends on the income 
elasticity of private goods relative to public goods.  To develop intuition for this important result, 
consider the case when the capital tax rate for a neighboring state rises.  In turn, mobile capital 
(eventually) flows into the state, and the tax base rises.  Depending on residents’ preferences for 
public vs. private goods and how these preferences change with income, residents may prefer to 
use this “windfall” to finance a tax cut – a negative or “see-saw” tax reaction – allowing higher 
private good consumption while still maintaining current levels of public good provision.  
Alternatively, they may prefer to disproportionately use the windfall to increase public good 
consumption, necessitating a higher capital tax rate – a positive or “race to the bottom” tax 
reaction.  Apart from the ambiguity of the sign of the slope, the theoretical model has an 
additional implication that the absolute value of the slope increases with the mobility of capital.  
Tax instruments that target new, highly-mobile capital (the ITC) should have larger reaction 
function slopes than do instruments targeting old, less mobile capital (the CIT).   
Section III presents the estimating equation and introduces two econometric innovations 
into the tax competition literature.  First, as we shall see below, the effects of aggregate shocks 
prove critical in evaluating the reaction function.  We go beyond the standard time fixed effects 
estimator that constrains responses to an aggregate shock to be homogeneous across states.  
Instead, we employ the Common Correlated Effects (CCE) estimator, developed by Pesaran 
(2006), that allows for heterogeneous responses across states.  Second, the theory of tax 
competition strongly implies that there will be an endogeneity problem with estimating the slope 
of the reaction function.  We develop and implement a new procedure for selecting instruments 
that are both valid and relevant.     
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Section IV discusses our panel dataset for 48 U.S. states for the period 1965 to 2006.  
This dataset has the virtues of a substantial amount of cross-section and time-series variation for 
an economic environment that is relatively free of impediments to the flow of capital.  We have 
data on five tax variables – the investment tax credit, the corporate income tax rate, the tax 
wedge on capital, the average corporate tax rate, and the capital apportionment weight – and a set 
of political, demographic, and economic variables to serve as controls and instruments.  
Section V presents our empirical results that document the importance of controlling for 
aggregate shocks and delayed responses.  When either of these elements is not controlled for in 
the econometric model, we obtain a positively sloped reaction function, as reported in most prior 
work.  When both time fixed effects and time lags enter, the reaction function has a negative 
slope.  These results are robust in several dimensions.  Moreover, consistent with a prediction of 
our model, the slope is larger (in absolute value) for the ITC relative to the CIT.  
Section VI offers a brief discussion of some of the relevant literature on reaction 
functions.  Section VII summarizes and discusses how our “riding on a seesaw” finding informs 
policy discussions concerning tax competition and capital mobility. 
 
 
II.  The Tax Reaction Function: Theoretical Underpinnings And Empirical Implications  
 
  This section develops a model of strategic competition and extracts implications for the 
tax reaction function – the equilibrium response of tax policy in a home (in-state) jurisdiction to 
tax policy in a foreign (out-of-state) jurisdiction.  We show that the slope of the reaction function 
can be positive (“racing to the bottom”) or negative (“riding on a seesaw”) and that the sign of 
this slope depends on the sign of one key parameter:  the income elasticity of private goods 
relative to public goods.  While the model developed in this section is not appropriate for welfare 
analysis, it is useful for identifying the determinants of the slope of the reaction function and 
motivating the linear model to be estimated and interpreted in the empirical section of this paper.   
 
A.  A Model Of Tax Competition  
Our model of tax competition is based on six relations that describe the constraints faced 
by a government choosing business tax policy to maximize the utility of the representative   
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domestic household.  First, production in the home state is determined by a Cobb-Douglas 
function that depends on a mobile capital stock and a fixed factor of production, such as labor or 
a composite of land and labor.   The capital stock available for home production (K) is the sum 
of the capital stocks owned by home residents (k) and, given the mobility of capital, the capital 
stock owned by foreign residents located in the home jurisdiction (
f k) .
4  We write the 
production function (F[K] ) in the following intensive form relative to the fixed factor of 
production,  
 
   yF [ K ]  ,             ( 1 )  
      
f Kkk  ,             
 
Second, as a result of capital mobility, the capital stock in a given jurisdiction is sensitive 
to capital income tax rates prevailing in its and foreign jurisdictions.  Consequently, the capital 
stock in the home jurisdiction depends negatively on the home tax rate () and positively on the 
foreign tax rate ( f  ), as well as on a set of controls reflecting home and foreign demographic and 
economic variables ( f
kk xa n d x , respectively), 
 
    ff
kk KK [ , : x , x ]   .           ( 2 )  
   f K [.] 0, K [.] 0.     
 
This capital mobility function allows economic variables to affect home capital demand insofar 
as they impact production possibilities and the marginal product of capital.  It proves convenient 
to assume that the derivatives with respect to the home and foreign tax rates are equal and 
opposite in sign ( f K [.] K [.]     ), though the qualitative results do not require this assumption.
5 
  Equations (1) and (2) can be combined to generate a relation between production and the 
                                                 
4 If the state is a net capital exporter, k
f < 0.  Without loss in generality, we analyze a capital importing 
state.  
 
5  While equation (2) is consistent with the standard constraint on net-of-tax return equalization across 
jurisdictions, it allows for the possibility that, owing to a variety of frictions, the net-of-tax returns on 
capital may differ. See Appendix A for analytic details.     
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home and foreign tax rates, 
 
    ff ff
kk kk y F [ K ] F K [ ,: x , x ] G [ ,: x , x ]          ,       ( 3 )  
   f G [.] 0, G [.] 0.      
 
The derivative,  f G[ . ]0   , represents the incremental production from a tax-induced flow of 
capital from the foreign state to the home state. 
Third, we link net income to expenditures by means of GDP accounting relations.  Net 
income is measured by gross income (production) less the return on capital assets (
f r ) owned by 
foreign residents but located in the home jurisdiction.  Net income equals expenditures on public 
(g) and private (c) goods. 
 
   
f yr gc   .            ( 4 )  
 
Fourth, the government’s budget constraint (stated per unit of the fixed factor) equates 
public goods expenditure to an origin-based tax.  This tax is defined as the product of the capital 
income tax rate () and capital income, the latter defined as the marginal product of capital 
(F'[K]) multiplied by the capital stock located in the home state,  
 
   g F'[K] K y   .
6          ( 5 )  
 
Given the Cobb-Douglas production function, capital income in the home state is a fixed share 
() of output.      
  Fifth, capital imported from abroad is paid a return equal to the marginal product of 
                                                 
6 We focus on the capital income tax as the sole source of fiscal revenue for simplicity of exposition.  The 
model can be expanded to include a wage tax (at rate  wage  ) or a sales tax (at rate  sales  ).  In these cases, 
the H[ ]   in equation (7) below is redefined as   
wage f
wage wage H[ ] ( 1) / ( ( 1 ) ) 1         and 

sales f
sales sales H[ ]( 1 ) / 1     , respectively.   
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capital multiplied by the amount of foreign capital located in the home state.  The return on 
imported capital is a fixed share ( f  ) of output, 
 
   
ff f rF ' [ K ] k y   ,           ( 6 )  
 
f     
    
  Equations (4), (5), and (6) can be combined to generate a relation between the mix of 
private to public goods (c/g) and the tax rate.  We multiply and divide the two terms on the right-
side of equation (4) by g, use equations (5) and (6) to eliminate g and 
f r , respectively, and 
rearrange the resulting equation to obtain the following equation, 
 
   c/g / 1 H[ ]   ,           ( 7 )  
   
f (1 )/ 1 (provided 0.5)        ,    
H[ . ] 0   . 
 
Based on (7), the tax rate must increase to raise the share of output devoted to public goods.    
The sixth and final equation is the utility function that depends on private and public 
goods and that policymakers maximize by their choice of .  We represent the utility of the 
representative home resident by the addilog utility function.  Houthakker (1960) introduced this 
function and noted that it is most suitable when the arguments in the utility function are large 
distinct aggregates and when the primary force driving allocations is through changes in income.  
Both properties are satisfied in our tax competition setting, and we work with the following 
indirect utility function (V[y]),  
 
      
cg ff
cc gg V[y] (y(1 )) / p (y(1 )) / p

      ,       ( 8 )  
 
where  cg c g ,,, a n d    are parameters (the latter two parameters may represent state specific 
characteristics such as political preferences) and  c p  and  g p  are the prices for c and g,   
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respectively.  Relying on Roy’s identity to generate the demand functions for c and g and 
normalizing the prices to unity through an appropriate choice of units, we obtain after some 
additional manipulation the following equation for the ratio of the demands for c to g 
(Houthakker, 1960, equation (30)), 
 
    
,y ff c/g [y( 1 ):x ] y( 1 ) ,
 






      
 
 
In equation (9), the private and public goods mix depends on income and home state control 
variables (e.g., population and voter preferences) represented by x.  A preference between 
private and public goods is a key element in this and other tax competition models (e.g., 
Bruecker and Saavadra (2001), Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Wilson and Janeba (2005), and 
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)).  In equation (9), this preference is represented by the  c   and 
g  parameters whose difference defines the income elasticity of private goods relative to public 
goods,  ,y   .  This elasticity plays a major role in determining the sign of the slope of the 
reaction function.  
  The above model serves as a vehicle for studying the properties of the tax reaction 
function.  The model is summarized by equations (3), (7), and (9).  Substituting the first two 
equations into the third equation, we obtain the following relation between home and foreign tax 
rates,   
 
   c/g [y],             ( 1 0 )  




0G [ , : x , x ] ( 1 ) : xH [ ] ,
0[ , : x ] .
        

     
   f
kk x{ x , x , x }    
 
The existence of an equilibrium  is verified in Appendix B.   
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B.  Empirical Implications  
Equation (10) implicitly defines a relation between home and foreign tax rates, and thus 
can be used to compute the reaction function for  with respect to changes in  f  .  Adopting the 
standard Nash assumption used in the literature, we assume policymakers in the home state treat 
foreign tax policy as given.  Differentiating equation (7) with respect to  and  f   with the chain 
rule and rearranging yields the following reaction function,   
 











       
,           ( 1 1 a )  
                      y,K K, *( ) 0      ,        (11b) 
 
where the  's   are elasticities and  y,K   and  K,   are positive.  These two parameters are 
represented by , defined in equation (11b) and interpreted as the incremental output from a tax-
induced flow of capital.   
  The first empirical implication of our model follows from the relation between the slope 
of the reaction function and  ,y    (the income elasticity of private goods relative to public goods) 
and is evaluated when this parameter is zero, negative, or positive.  To develop the intuition for 
the slope of the reaction function under alternative values of  ,y    , consider the situation where 
the foreign tax rate ( f  ) rises.  Mobile capital (eventually) will flow into the home jurisdiction, 
and thus the tax base (capital income) will rise.
7  The allocation of this “windfall” to private vs. 
public goods and the subsequent impact on financing of public goods through taxation are the 
key elements determining the sign of the slope of the reaction function, as we will see in the 
subsequent three cases.    
 
                                                 
7 An additional benefit from the relatively lower tax rate (not modeled here) is that, if firms in the home 
state are non-competitive, the capital inflow will increase production and competitive pressures, possibly 
lower non-competitive profit margins, and increase welfare.  This channel has been documented in the 
context of offshore financial centers by Rose and Spiegel (2007).   
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   Case I:   f
,y 0d / d0         
The assumption that the relative division of resources between private and public goods remains 
unaltered ( ,y 0   ) implies that there is no need to change the home tax rate to alter the mix.  
This case is consistent with homothetic utility in private and public goods.  The reaction function 
is flat.    
 
   Case II:   f
,y 0d / d0        
Under this assumption, the one term in the numerator and the two terms in the denominator of 
equation (11) are each negative; hence the overall derivative is positive.  The negative value for 
,y    represents a preference for diverting a disproportionate amount of the windfall toward the 
public good.  Since public goods need to be financed by tax revenues, this preference dictates an 
increase in  and thus a positive-sloping reaction function. 
 
   Case III:   f
,y 0d / d0        
Under this assumption, the numerator is unambiguously positive; the slope of the reaction 
function depends on the relative magnitudes of elasticities in the denominator.  A sufficient 
condition for the denominator to be negative is  ,y 03    .
8  Under this condition, the windfall 
is directed toward a relative increase in private goods.  For instance, residents may view current 
levels of public services as satisfactory and would thus rather spend most or the entire windfall 
on private consumption.  The windfall relaxes the budget constraint and allows the home 
jurisdiction to lower tax rates while maintaining public good consumption.  Such a situation 
would result in a negative or “see-saw” tax reaction. 
  The above analysis highlights that the slope of the reaction function is indeterminate a 
priori and depends crucially on the income elasticity of private goods relative to public goods 
                                                 
8 This sufficient condition is based on the following computation.  Upper bounds on  k, y,k and     (the 
two elasticities defining  ) are 1.00 (from a Cobb-Douglas production function) and 0.33 (capital’s share 
in production), respectively.   If  ,y 3   , then  ,y (* ) 1    and, since  f ((1 )/( (1 )) 1     , the 
denominator of equation (11) is negative.   
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( ,y   ).
9  This sensitivity is documented in Figure 5, which plots the slope of the reaction 
function (equation (11)) against values of  ,y    ranging from -2.0 to 2.0 in increments of 0.10.   
  The model developed in this Section has an additional testable implication – the slope 
should vary systematically depending on whether the tax instrument applies to highly mobile 
new capital or less mobile old capital.
10  Intuitively, the more responsive capital is to tax stimuli, 
the greater should be the response as measured by the slope of the reaction function; a positively 
sloped (negatively sloped) reaction function will be more positive (more negative) for the tax 
instrument targeting relatively mobile capital.  Capital mobility is measured by the absolute 
value of the elasticity of capital with respect to the tax instrument,  K,  .  Differentiating 
equation (11) with respect to this elasticity, we obtain the following result,  
 
   

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                     
              
.  (12) 
 
The testable implication depends on the slope of the reaction function and hence on the value of 
,y   .  In the empirical work, we expect that the slope of the reaction function will be greater in 
absolute value for the investment tax credit affecting new capital versus the corporate income tax 
rate that affects both new and old capital, 
 
                                                 
9 The possibility of a negatively sloped reaction function has been emphasized by Bruecker and Savaadra 
(2001, section on “Reaction Functions”) and noted, though not usually highlighted, in several other tax 
competition studies:  Mintz and Tulkens (1986, Section 3.2 and fn. 15), Wilson and Janeba (2005, p. 
1218), and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986, Section III).  Razin and Sadka (2011) show that a standard 
tax competition model augmented with an upward supply of immigrants does not lead to lower tax rates 
and a race to the bottom.  Mendoza and Tesar (2005) establish that, in a model where government 
spending is held constant, the occurrence of a race to the bottom is sensitive to which tax instrument 
(labor vs. consumption tax rates) is used to balance the budget in the face of a decrease in the capital 
income tax rate.   
 
10 Wildasin (2007) makes an important point about the differential sensitivity of “new” and “old” capital 
to the ITC and CIT, respectively, and discusses the implications for tax policy and rent transfers.     
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   .           ( 1 3 )  
 
To summarize, the model developed in this section guides the specification of the 
econometric model and the interpretation of the empirical results.  In this framework, the sign of 
the reaction function is ambiguous and depends on the sign of the income elasticity of private 
goods relative to public goods for the representative household.  Moreover, the absolute value of 
this slope increases with capital mobility.  The latter is measured by the tax-price elasticity for 
capital  k, ()   , and this elasticity is higher for the investment tax credit rate (targeting new 
capital) than for the corporate income tax rate (targeting both new and old capital). 
 
 
III.  Estimation Issues 
 
A.  The Estimating Equation 
The objective of our empirical work is to identify the slope of the reaction function for 
state capital tax policies.  We focus primarily on the investment tax credit rate (ITC) and the 
corporate income tax rate (CIT).  As extensions to these results, we also estimate models for the 
other three tax variables displayed in Figures 3 and 4:  the tax wedge of capital, the average 
corporate tax rate, and capital apportionment weight.  The strategic tax competition model 
implies that the reaction function can be represented by a specification of the following form,  
 
    f
i,t i,t i,t i,t xu ,                ( 1 4 )  
 
where  i,t   is a tax variable for state i at time t,  f
i,t   is the tax variable for the foreign states,  i,t x 
is a vector of control variables,  i,t u  is an error term, and the scalar  and vector  are 
parameters to be estimated.  We measure  f
i,t   by the 1
st order spatial lag of the tax variable,  i,t  : 
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      ,           ( 1 5 a )  






  ,         (15b) 
where  p S {.} is the spatial lag operator of order p,  i,j   is a weight defining the “distance” 
between state i to the remaining J-1 states indexed by j.  Given the presence of a spatial lag of 
the dependent variable as an explanatory variable, equations of the above form are sometimes 
referred to as a spatial autoregressive model.  An immediate implication of the strategic tax 
competition model is that  f
i,t   will be endogenous; Section III.C addresses this endogeneity issue 
and discusses how we overcome the potential inconsistency problem. 
We include five variables in the vector  i,t x  (which contains variables dated t and t-1).  
Three control variables are chosen to account for preferences for the mix of private and public 
goods ( pref
i,t 1 x  ) and for economic ( eco
i,t 1 x  ) and demographic ( dem
i,t x ) effects.  To avoid estimation 
problems arising from simultaneity, the preference and the economic variables are time lagged 
one period.  As suggested by equation (10) in the theoretical model, 1
st order spatial lags of the 
economic and demographic control variables ( eco,f dem,f
i,t 1 i,t x  and x  , respectively) capture the 
impact of foreign variables on the setting of tax rates in a given state and by its competitors.   
We extend the basic tax competition specification (equation (14)) in two important ways.  
First, we allow for the possibility that the impact of the key tax competition variable may be 
distributed over several time periods.  The introduction of time lags of competitive states’ tax 
policy,  f
i,t  , recognizes that the driving force behind a non-zero reaction function slope is the 
mobility of capital.  This flow of capital may occur gradually over several years.  
Second, our specification of the error term is new to the study of state tax policy (to the 
best of our knowledge) and has a generalized two-way error component structure that allows for 
heterogeneous cross-section dependence (CSD) among states, 
 
    i,t i i t i,t uf    ,          ( 1 6 )    
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where  i   is a state-specific shock,  i,t   is a state-specific shock that varies over time and is 
independent of  i,t x ,  t f  is an unobserved time-specific shock ( t f  may represent a vector of 
shocks), and  i   is a state-specific aggregate factor loading.  The  it f   term allows for 
heterogeneous CSD among the states that may be important.  All states are affected by common 
aggregate shocks such as energy prices, federal and foreign tax policies, globalization pressures, 
and U.S. macroeconomic conditions.  These aggregate shocks are represented by  t f .  However, 
the impact (direction and magnitude) of these aggregate shocks may vary by state.  For instance, 
changes in energy prices may have different effects on New England states than on those states 
in the “oil patch” (e.g., Oklahoma and Texas).  These differential responses are captured by the 
state-specific factor loadings,  i  .  The conventional time fixed effects (TFE) model is a special 
case of this framework and is obtained from equation (16) when  i    for all i.  









               .       ( 1 7 )  
 
For convenience, we will denote the sum of the coefficients on the current and lagged values of 
the competitive states’ tax variable, which represents the long-run slope of the reaction function, 
by α, 
 




   .             ( 1 8 )  
 
The strategic tax competition model necessarily implies that the three shocks – 
ii , t i t ,, a n d f   – that affect state i are correlated with tax policy in the competitive states,  f
i,t  .  
We address the resulting estimation problem in the following three ways.  First,  i   is modeled 
as a state fixed effect.  Second,  it f   is modeled using the Common Correlated Effects (CCE) 
estimator of Pesaran (2006) that will be discussed in Section III.B.  Third, the correlation   
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between  i,t   and  f
i,t   is accounted for by projecting the latter variable on a set of instruments, 
i,t z .  Our implementation of the instrumental variables estimator is somewhat complicated by 
the CCE estimator, and we address this problem in Section III.C.   
 
B.  The Common Correlated Effects (CCE) Estimator 
The CCE estimator is an important innovation for analyzing tax competition because it 
allows states to have heterogeneous responses to aggregate shocks.  Such common shocks are 
usually controlled for in panel studies with time fixed effects.  As discussed above with respect 
to energy prices, federal and foreign tax policies, globalization forces, and macroeconomic 
conditions, the assumption that all states are affected identically by aggregate shocks is 
restrictive and may bias all estimated coefficients.  Of particular concern is the possibility that 
states’ responses to aggregate shocks are correlated across space in a similar manner to the 
spatial pattern of capital mobility and hence tax competition.  In other words, the state-specific 
factor loadings on the aggregate shock,  i  , may be correlated with current and lagged values of 
f
i,t  .  Heterogeneous responses could be accounted for by Seemingly Unrelated Regression, but 
this framework is not feasible when the number of cross-section units exceeds 10.  The CCE 
estimator, on the other hand, is feasible for panels with a large number of cross-section units and 
it accounts for the unobservable  it f   by including cross-section averages (CSA) of the 
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          





      ( 1 9 )  
 
where the bar above a variables denotes its CSA.  If the  i 's  in equation (19) are constrained to 
be 1 for all i, the specification would be equivalent to transforming the data by demeaning each 
variable with respect to its CSA, a standard way of controlling for time fixed effects with the 
least squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimator.  In general, the CSA in the CCE estimator are   
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formed with a set of state weights,  j v  for j = 1,…,J, (note that these weights are unrelated to the 
i,j   state-pair weights used to construct the tax competition variable in Section IV.C), such that, 
 
   
J










   
 
As shown by Pesaran (2006), the asymptotic properties of the CCE estimator are invariant to the 
choice of the  j v  weights.  The empirical work reported here is based on equal weighting 
( j v1 / J   for all j).   
  
C.  Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables 
The theory of tax competition has the strong implication that  f
i,t   will be correlated with 
shocks to  i,t   appearing in the error term.    We address this endogeneity problem with 
instrumental variables (IV).
11  The endogenous f
i,t   variable is projected on a set of instruments 
j,t z .  The fitted value,  f
i,t ˆ  , then replaces  f
i,t   in  equation (19).
12 A common challenge in the 
empirical tax competition literature is to identify a set of instruments that are both valid and 
                                                 
11 Instrumental variables is one of two approaches typically used to estimate spatially autoregressive 
models.  The other is maximum likelihood (e.g., Case, Hines, and Rosen, 1993), which is far more 
computationally intensive.  See Brueckner (2003) for an extensive discussion of the econometric issues 
associated with identification of spatially autoregressive models in the context of tax competition and 
Pesaran (2006, Section 1) for a general review of estimation strategies.   
 
12 Since  f
i,t ˆ   is a generated regressor, we have investigated whether adjusting the standard errors with the 
procedure of Topel and Murphy (1985) has a notable impact on the standard errors.  The adjustment turns 
out to have very little impact and hence we do include this adjustment in the results shown in this paper.  
Moreover, for testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient on  f
i,t ˆ   equals zero, no adjustment is 
necessary (Pagan, 1984).   
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relevant from the very large pool of feasible instruments.  Tax competition theory, as well as 
spatial-econometric theory (e.g., Kapoor, Kelejian, and Prucha, 2007), typically suggest that 
spatial lags of the control variables should be valid instruments.  However, there may be a large 
number of control variables and, for any given control variable, there may be 1
st or higher-order 
spatial lag measures.  Unfortunately, IV estimators is known to be biased in finite samples when 
a large number of instruments are used (Hansen, Hausman, and Newey, 2008).  Thus, we adopt 
the following three-step search procedure to obtain an optimal instrument set for each of our tax 
variables.  For the purposes of obtaining these optimal instrument sets, we focus on the standard 
two-way (state and time) fixed effects model.
13   
 
1)  First, the potential set of instruments for a given tax variable –  ,i,t z  – is constructed from 
lists of included and excluded instruments.  Included instruments are the five conditioning 
variables in  i,t x  and the state and year dummies.
14  Excluded instruments comprise a set of 
16 voter preference variables for the competitive states:  the 1
st and 2
nd order spatial lags of 
the eight voter preference variables defined in Section IV.D. 
 
2)  Second, we form sets corresponding to all possible combinations of the excluded 
instruments.  For each instrument set and for a given tax variable, we estimate the two-way 
fixed effects IV model and store the minimum eigenvalue statistic (a multiple endogenous   
variable generalization of the 1
st-Stage F-statistic) and the p-value of the Hansen-Sargan J 
test of overidentifying restrictions.
   A p-value greater than an arbitrary critical value implies 
that the null hypothesis is sustained and that the instruments are valid.  Admissible 
instrument sets are identified as those whose p-values exceed a critical value of 0.10.  
  
3)  Third, from this admissible set of valid instruments, we then choose the instrument set that 
                                                 
13 Optimal instrument sets are identified separately for models without lags and with three lags of  f
i,t     
The optimal instrument set obtained for the three-lag model is used for all models containing lags of  f
i,t  . 
 
14 An interesting issue related to the proper choice of instruments for a panel model with two-way fixed 
effects is the potential “Nickell bias” (Nickell (1981)).  As is well known in time-series models, the 
within IV estimator with predetermined variables (e.g., time lagged endogenous variables) is biased in 
finite-T samples because the predetermined variables are correlated with the within-transformed error 
term.  In principle, this suggests that time lags of included instruments are invalid.  However, what is not 
generally recognized is that there also is a parallel (or perhaps “perpendicular”) finite-N bias coming from 
the spatial dimension.  The two-way within estimator also transforms the error to sweep out time fixed 
effects that may be correlated with spatial lags of the included instruments, thus invalidating such spatial 
lags as instruments.  It is important to keep in mind, however, that both biases vanish as T or N gets large 
and the rate of convergence is rather rapid.  Thus, these potential problems do not arise in our dataset with 
T and N dimensions of 42 and 48, respectively.     
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is most relevant, as assessed by the minimum eigenvalue statistic.  While we are not 
interested in formal hypothesis testing of instrument relevance, it is interesting to evaluate 
the null hypothesis of instrument irrelevance in terms of the 5% critical values presented in 
Table 1 of Stock and Yogo (2005); for seven or fewer excluded instruments and a bias 
greater than 10%, the critical value is 11.29.  The instrument sets selected by our algorithm 
(one for each of the five tax policies we analyze) all exceed this critical value.  
 
The optimal instrument set thus identified for a given tax variable is labeled  *
,i,t z .  While 
this procedure does not have a formal statistical basis nor is it based on an explicit metric, it has 
the virtues of generating a set of instruments that will yield consistent estimates and is based on 
a formal, non-discretionary algorithm.  To the best of our knowledge, there are no formal 
statistical tests for choosing instruments (or moment conditions) that satisfy both the validity 
and relevance criteria.  For example, the moment selection procedures of Andrews (1999) and 
Andrews and Biao (2001) focus on instrument validity and maintain instrument relevance.  
Conversely, Donald and Newey (2001) suggest a search criterion for selecting an optimal 
instrument set based on relevance, but they assume all potential sets are valid.  Section V.B 
examines the robustness of our results to relaxing the validity restriction in step 2.   
    
D.  The General Specification and Implementation 
  The above considerations lead to the following general specification that is the basis of 
the estimates reported in Section V, 
     
N
ff




t t  i0 tj t n
n1
ˆ    x
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       ( 2 1 )  
   
where, relative to equation (19), we have replaced the endogenous variable,  f
i,t  , with the fitted 
value,  f
i,t ˆ  , in the first line and replaced the endogenous variable’s CSA, 
_
f
t  , with the 
instrumental variable’s CSA, 
_
f
t ˆ  .  When responses to aggregate shocks are constrained to be the   
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same for all states,  i   , and this constrained estimator is equivalent to standard time fixed 
effects.  We also will present estimates based on ignoring aggregate shocks; in this case,  i 0  . 
  The CCE model, as can be seen in equations (19) or (21), is nonlinear in parameters, 
which complicates its implementation.  There are at least three ways to estimate this model.  The 
first approach ignores the nonlinear restrictions imposed on the model by simply allowing each 
of the CSA terms (the terms on the second line of equation (21)) to have a separate, state-varying 
coefficient.  This can be implemented by interacting state dummies with each of the CSA terms 
and including all of these interactions, along with the other variables of the model (those in the 
first line of equation (21)), in a linear OLS regression.  For example, one would estimate a set of 
coefficients,  ii 0  , on the CSA of the contemporaneous tax competition variable, 
_
f
t ˆ  .  Such 
a regression is perfectly feasible, but it is quite inefficient given that it involves estimating a very 
large number of nuisance parameters.  In our case, with 48 states, 5 control variables, and 
contemporaneous plus up to 4 lags of  f
i,t ˆ  , we would have 586 parameters.  We will refer to this 
estimator as the “unrestricted/inefficient CCE” estimator.   
A second possible way of estimating this model is via a nonlinear estimator such as 
nonlinear least squares or maximum likelihood.  However, even with the restrictions imposed, 
there are still a fairly large number of parameters to estimate, and nonlinear estimators may have 
difficulty converging. 
  A third approach, and our preferred one, is to first obtain consistent estimates of  i  , insert 
these  i ˆ 's  into equation (21), and then estimate the resulting parsimonious model via linear least 
squares.  Specifically, we implement the following three-step process: 
 
–  Step 1:  Estimate the linear, unrestricted CCE estimator to obtain consistent (but 
inefficient) estimates of α0, αj’s, and β.  (Number of estimated parameters = 586.) 
 
–  Step 2:  Use these as initial values for the α0, αj’s, and β that pre-multiply the CSA terms 
(i.e., those on the second line of equation (21)).  Obtain new estimates of the α0, αj’s, and 
β from the main regressors (i.e., those on the first line of equation (21)) and use them as 
the α0, αj’s, and β on the second line (the γi’s are also estimated at each iteration).  Iterate 




 lines converge (the convergence criterion is that each 
individual parameter estimate is within 1% in absolute value of its previous value).  At   
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this point, the model yields consistent and efficient estimates of γi.  (Number of estimated 
parameters = 106.)  
 
–  Step 3:  Impose the  i ˆ   from step 2.  Estimate the resulting linear model via least squares 
to obtain consistent and efficient estimates of α0, αj’s, and β (plus state fixed effects).  
(Number of estimated parameters = 58.)  
 
 
We refer to this three-step estimator as the “efficient” or “restricted” CCE estimator.  It 
should be emphasized that the purpose of imposing the CCE restrictions is for efficiency.  
Consistent estimates can also be obtained from the “unrestricted/inefficient” estimator in step 1.  
Thus, while most of the results we report below are obtained with the efficient CCE estimator, 
we also compare these results to those from the inefficient CCE estimator (see Table 4).  As 
expected, the point estimates are similar between the two, but the efficient estimates are much 
more precise.   
 
IV.  U.S. State-Level Panel Data   
Our estimates of the capital-tax reaction function are based on a U.S. state-level panel 
data for the period 1965 to 2006.  The panel aspect of these data is crucial for understanding state 
tax policy for at least three reasons.  First, state-specific fixed factors, such as natural amenities, 
affect a state’s desire for government services and hence its tax and expenditure policies.  Initial 
policies, stemming perhaps from historical policy choices persisting to the present era due to 
political economy forces (Coate and Morris (1999)) also determine current policies.  The impact 
of these and other state-specific fixed factors (e.g., state industry mix) will be accounted for with 
state fixed effects.  Second, state tax policy may be sensitive to aggregate shocks (e.g., energy 
prices) that vary over time, and these influences will be captured by time fixed effects or, more 
generally, by the CCE estimator that allows heterogeneous responses across states.  Third, panel 
data long in the time dimension allow for the possibility that the response of state tax policy is 
distributed over several years.  As we shall see in Section V, the latter two factors prove very 
important in the empirical analysis.  We now turn to a discussion of the data underlying the 
variables used in our empirical analysis.  Details about variable definitions and data sources are 
provided in Appendix A.   
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A.  Capital Tax Policy ( ) 
The model developed above, as well as the tax competition literature in general, analyzes 
the determination of a single tax on each unit of capital.  Across the 48 states, the primary 
capital-tax policies are investment tax credits (ITC) and the corporate income tax (CIT).  These 
policies target different types of capital, and hence their reaction functions should have different 
slopes that depend on the degree of mobility of the targeted capital.  The reaction functions 
associated with these two tax variables form our baseline empirical results presented in Section 
V.A.  We extend our analysis by estimating the reaction functions associated with three other tax 
variables – the tax wedge on capital, the average corporate tax rate, and the capital 
apportionment weight – in Section V.C.    
 
B.  Control Variables (x) 
Recall that our model of strategic tax competition implies that variation in state capital 
tax policy is due to three control demographic, economic, and political preference variables that 
we measure by population (POPULATION), the investment/capital ratio (IK), and voter 
preferences (PREFERENCES), respectively.  State population data come from the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  We account for local economic conditions with the manufacturing investment rate (the 
ratio of investment to capital stock).  The raw source data used to construct this variable is the 
Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM).  The real manufacturing capital stocks are constructed 
according to the perpetual inventory method.  Data outside of manufacturing for the years of our 
sample are unavailable.   
Political preferences of state residents are, of course, unobserved.  However, these 
preferences should, to a large extent, be revealed by electoral outcomes.  Thus, the political party 
affiliations of the governor and state legislators should provide good proxies for preferences 
(Besley and Case (2003); Snyder and Groseclose (2000); Reed (2006)).  Specifically, we 
measure the following two political outcomes as indicator variables:   
 
(a)  the governor is Republican (R).  (The complementary class of politicians is  
Democrat (D) or Independent (I).  An informal examination of the political landscape 
suggests that Independents tend to be more closely aligned with the Democratic 
Party.  We thus treat D or I politicians as belonging to the same class, DI); 
 
  (b)  the majority of both houses of the legislature are R.   
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The PREFERENCES variable takes on one of three values:   
 
0   if the governor and the majority of both houses of the legislature are not R; 
1/2   if the governor is R but the majority of both houses of the legislature are not R 
  or if the governor is not R but the majority of both houses of the legislature are R; 
1   if the governor and the majority of both houses of the legislature are R. 
 
C.  Foreign (Out-of-State) Variables ( , f f x  )   
The two-state model developed in Section II is useful for understanding the intuition of 
strategic tax competition, but its focus on a single foreign jurisdiction is obviously highly 
stylized.  In taking a tax competition model to data, however, one must confront the issue of 
evaluating the model when there are many foreign states competing for the capital tax base.  It is 
generally infeasible to allow for a separate slope of the tax reaction function for each and every 
other foreign state.  The approach taken in the literature, which we follow in this paper, is to 
measure foreign state variables (denoted by a superscript f) using spatial lags of the home state  
variable.  A spatial lag is a weighted average of a variable over all foreign states.             
In this paper, we focus on tax competition among the 48 contiguous U.S. states.
15  
Equation (15) details the construction of the spatial lag and the weighting matrix, W, a 48x48 
matrix with elements i,j   defining the “relatedness” of state i to the remaining 47 states indexed 
by j.  The elements of the weighting matrix are chosen a priori and are meant to capture the 
degree of potential mobility of capital between the i
th state to each of the j foreign states.   
The most natural weighting scheme and the one used most frequently in the literature is 
based on geographic proximity.  We construct a W matrix with elements equal to the inverse-
distance between state pairs, where distance is the number of miles between each state’s 
population centroid.    Each row of W is normalized so that the elements sum to one.  A 
shortcoming of this geographic proximity measure is that it may not sufficiently discriminate 
among states.  For example, while one might suspect that the economic interactions between 
California and Texas are greater than between California and Nebraska, the geographic 
proximity measure will give approximately equal weight to both pair of states.  As an extension 
                                                 
15 We exclude Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia because of missing data for some of the 
weighting matrices and, for Alaska and Hawaii, because their great distance to other states strains the 
notion of “neighboring states.”   
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presented in Section V.C,  we construct a matrix based on commodity trade-flows in which 
element  i,j   is the (row-normalized) value of commodity shipments from the i
th state to the j
th 
state, according to data from the 1997 Survey of Commodity Flows.    
 
D.  Candidate Instruments (z) 
  As discussed in Section III.C, we rely on eight voter preference variables defined over 
foreign states to form the candidate sets of instruments.  Our instrument search algorithm 
considers all possible combinations of 1
st order and 2
nd order spatial lags of these eight variables 
as potential instrument sets, with the restriction that if the 2
nd order spatial lag of a variable is 
included in a candidate set, its 1
st order spatial lag must also be included.  In addition to the two 
preference variables listed in Section IV.B for the governorship and legislature, we consider the 
following six political variables: 
 
  (c)  the majority of both houses of the legislature are DI;  
  (d)  the governorship changed last year from R to DI; 
  (e)  the majority control of the legislature changed last year from D or split (between   
                   houses) to R; 
  (f)  an interaction between the R governor and the R legislature indicator variables; 
  (g)  an interaction between R governor and the D legislature indicator variables (note that  
                   the omitted interaction category is R governor and a split legislature dummy);  
  (h)  the reelection of an incumbent governor last year.   
 
Data for these political variables come from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S. 
Census Bureau (Various Years)). 
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V.  Empirical Results   
A.  Baseline Results  
Tables 1 through 3 show the core results of the paper.  Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by year.  The purpose of clustering by year is to account for any 
remaining contemporaneous correlation of the error terms across states in a very general manner.  
In particular, the common assumption in spatial econometrics of 1
st order spatial autocorrelation 
is nested within this general clustering.   
Table 1 presents the results of estimating equation (21) for the investment tax credit 
(ITC) with cross-section dependence accounted for by the CCE estimator and with various time 
lags.  (Notes to the tables follow Table 7.)  Column A contains estimates for a static model (i.e., 
number of lags of  f
i,t   included is 0) and, as has occurred frequently in the literature, the slope of 
the reaction function is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels.  In fact, the 
point estimate is quite large.  A reaction function slope outside the unit circle would be unstable, 
suggesting a lack of convergence to a steady-state equilibrium set of tax rates across states. 
The sign of the reaction function, however, flips to negative when time lags of the tax 
competition variable are introduced.  Column B adds the first time lag,  f
i,t 1   , to the 
specification.  The sum of the two coefficients on  f
i,t   and  f
i,t 1    is now negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  This sum of the contemporaneous and once-lagged tax competition 
variables, α, represents an estimate of the long-run slope of the reaction function.  Adding 
additional lags of  f
i,t   yields a very similar long-run slope estimate, as shown in Columns C to E. 
Table 2 repeats this exercise with the ITC replaced by the corporate income tax (CIT) 
rate.  The qualitative pattern found for the ITC – a positive slope flipping to a negative slope 
when time lags enter – also holds for the CIT.  However, for the CIT, the point estimates of the 
slope are closer to zero (relative to Table 1) for all of the specifications, and they are 
insignificantly different from zero for those specifications containing lags.  
The estimated coefficients on the control variables in Tables 1 and 2 for the lagged 
models, which we believe to be the most appropriate specification, also warrant a brief 
discussion.  The coefficient on PREFERENCES suggests that states where voters tend to vote 
Republican have lower values for the ITC and CIT.  This result could be consistent with a   
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“liberatarian” or “tea party” type of Republicanism that favors both low investment subsidies and 
low corporate taxes (recognizing that the former need to be financed by the latter).  The one-
year-lagged investment rate (IKi,t-1) has  no significant effect on the ITC or CIT.  The spatial lag 
of this variable has a negative and significant coefficient for ITC, perhaps suggesting that states 
view weak investment activity in competing states as an opportunity to attract capital to their 
own state by raising (or enacting) the ITC.  Lastly, both home and foreign state populations 
negatively affect ITC and CIT rates. 
Table 3 summarizes the variation in the estimated long-run slope of the reaction function, 
α, due to the tax policy instrument, the number of time lags included of the tax competition 
variable and controls for aggregate shocks.  As discussed in Section III, the CCE estimator 
allows for heterogeneous responses to aggregate shocks across states, the time fixed effects 
(TFE) estimator allows only for homogeneous responses across states, and the estimator with no 
time fixed effects (NTFE, a one-way state fixed effects estimator) does not allow for any 
response to aggregate shocks. 
Four key methodological findings emerge.  First, the inclusion of time lags of the tax 
competition variable has a large and negative effect on the estimated slope of the reaction 
function.  This finding holds regardless of whether and how one controls for aggregate shocks, 
and it holds for both tax policies.   
Second, controlling for at least one time lag, we find that the slope estimate is not very 
sensitive to the number of time lags included for our preferred CCE model.  For ITC, the slope 
estimate varies between -0.58 and -0.69 and is always statistically significant.  For CIT, the slope 
varies between 0.00 and -0.14, and in no case is statistically different from zero.  For the 
remainder of the paper, we will treat the three-lag model as our preferred specification.   
Third, controlling for aggregate shocks also has a strong effect on the estimated slope of 
the reaction function.  For ITC and for specifications allowing for lagged responses, controlling 
for aggregate shocks with standard time fixed effects and including time lags results in large 
negative slope estimates.  Allowing for heterogeneous responses of states to aggregate shocks 
with the CCE estimator leads to more moderate and more plausible negative slope estimates for 
ITC.  For CIT, adding standard time fixed effects has little impact on slope point estimates but 
increases standard errors substantially.  However, allowing for heterogeneous responses to 
aggregate shocks with the CCE estimator has a strong effect on the slope estimate for CIT.  The   
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resulting CCE slope estimates for the CIT models with time lags are negative but close to zero.
   
Fourth, in unreported results, we find considerable variation in the estimated state-
specific factor loadings on the aggregate shock,  i ˆ  .  The null hypothesis of equality of the 48 
i ˆ  ’s is easily rejected by a Wald test.  The rejection of homogeneity suggests that the standard 
time fixed effects model is misspecified with respect to our data.  
Aside from these methodological findings, the key economic result from Table 3 is that 
the slope of the reaction function for ITC is negative and significant, while the slope for CIT is 
insignificantly different from zero.  The larger (in absolute value) slope for ITC confirms the 
second implications of the theoretical model.  As shown in equations (12) and (13), the absolute 
value of the slope of the reaction function is expected to increase with capital mobility.  For the 
CCE model with three time lags, the estimated slopes are −0.588 and −0.077 for the ITC and 
CIT models, respectively; only the slope for the ITC is statistically different from zero.  This 
result is consistent with our theoretical model and the targeting of less mobile (new and old) 
capital by the CIT and more mobile (new) capital by the ITC. 
In sum, our baseline results document that, when we account for time lags and aggregate 
shocks, the slope of the reaction function is negative.  Allowing for both time lags in the tax 
competition variable and responses to aggregate shocks is crucial for obtaining an accurate 
estimate of the slope of the tax policy reaction function.  In our data, misspecifying the empirical 
model in either of these dimensions leads to a positive slope estimate.  Allowing for time lags is 
important because capital mobility among states is not instantaneous and occurs over more than 
one year.  Allowing for aggregate shocks is important because they create common incentives 
that will lead states to act more-or-less synchronously.  The positive slopes obtained when 
aggregate shocks are ignored accord with anecdotal evidence of positive reactions among states 
and the data in Figure 1.  However, in order to properly assess the response of home state tax 
policy to foreign state tax policy, we must condition on aggregate shocks.  With proper 
conditioning, the estimated slope of the reaction function is negative and more responsive for the 
ITC that targets new capital relative to the CIT that targets both new and old capital. 
 
B.  Robustness 
  In this subsection, we assess the robustness of our slope estimates to a variety of factors:   
(1) our method of implementing the CCE estimator; (2) the expansion of time lags to include all   
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right-hand side variables, rather than just time lags of the tax competition variable; (3) the 
modeling of dynamics with a lagged dependent variable; and (4 and 5) controls for the 
endogeneity of the tax competition variable. 
  Our first robustness check evaluates whether our three-step restricted CCE estimator 
yields similar results to the simpler unrestricted CCE estimator described in Section III.D.  Both 
estimators are consistent, but the latter is relatively less efficient.  The results for α, the estimated 
long-run slope of the reaction function, from each estimator, for specifications with varying lag 
lengths, are shown in Table 4.  For our preferred specification with three time lags, the two 
estimators yield very similar slope coefficients for ITC and CIT.  However, as expected, the 
standard errors from the linear unrestricted CCE estimator are much larger.   
Our second robustness check assesses the sensitivity of our main results to including time 
lags of all independent variables as opposed to just the tax competition variable.  Our preferred 
specification omits these additional time lags to conserve degrees of freedom, as each extra right-
hand side variable introduces another CSA term in the CCE estimator.  Nonetheless, estimating 
this full specification is feasible with CCE, as well as the standard two-way and one-way fixed 
effects estimators.  The results are shown in Table 5.  Relative to the results reported in Table 3, 
the same qualitative patterns emerge across estimators and across the number of lags in these 
“full” specifications, though the standard errors are larger, as expected.  The only notable 
difference is that the CIT reaction function slope from the CCE estimator with four lags is large 
and statistically significant.  This instability in results in Table 5 moving from one, two, or three 
lags to four lags suggests that degrees of freedom are being exhausted. 
  Our third robustness check examines an alternative specification that captures dynamics 
with a lagged dependent variable (LDV).  However, a major drawback of a dynamic model that 
includes one LDV and no lags of the independent variables is that the sign of the long-run effect 
on a given independent variable is restricted to be the same as the sign of the short-run effect.  
This restriction emerges because the long-run effect is calculated as the coefficient on the 
independent variable divided by one minus the coefficient on the LDV, which is typically 
between 0 and 1.
16  The LDV model is nested within the preferred model described above when 
                                                 
16 The use of an LDV also creates some econometric difficulties with correlations between the LDV and 
the state fixed effect (the “Nickell bias;” Nickell (1981), Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2007)) and 
the LDV and a serially correlated error term (Jacobs, Ligthart, and Vrijburg, 2010).     
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the latter has an infinite number of lags (see Appendix C).  Of course, an infinite-lag model 
cannot be estimated, but a restricted version, in which the coefficients on the independent 
variables for the first N time lags are unrestricted and the effects of lags beyond the N+1 period 
are captured parsimoniously by the dependent variable lagged N+1 periods, can be estimated. (A 
complete set of results for this specification are available from the authors upon request.)   For 
our preferred specification (N = 3), the results are qualitatively similar to the baseline results, 
with the implied long-run slope for the ITC being negative and statistically significant (though 
with a larger point estimate of -0.973) and the implied long-run slope for the CIT being negative 
and insignificant (with a point estimate of -0.172).  The dependent variable lagged four periods is 
always highly statistically significant (0.313 and 0.424 for the ITC and CIT models,respectively).    
  Our fourth robustness check evaluates the impact of the endogeneity of foreign state tax 
policy on the reaction function slope estimates.  Table 6 shows the  's   when the tax competition 
variable is treated as exogenous by estimating with OLS.  Two main findings emerge.  First, in 
the static specifications in column A, the OLS slope estimates are negative and significant when 
aggregate shocks are controlled for (either via TFE or CCE).  This result is in contrast to the IV 
results (Table 3) where the  's   are positive and significant in the static specification.  Second, 
for the specifications in Table 6 that allow for lagged effects and control for aggregate shocks, 
the  's   are similar to those obtained by IV (Table 3) for both tax policies and all three 
estimators.  In fact, to the extent there is a difference, the OLS results tend to be more negative 
than the IV results, suggesting that any OLS-bias on the slope estimate is negative.     
Our fifth and final robustness check also examines endogeneity.  As detailed in Section 
III.C, we use a three-step search procedure to obtain an optimal instrument set,  *
,i,t z , for each of 
our tax variables.  The instruments in  *
,i,t z  are those with the highest first-stage fit, conditional 
on being valid at the 10% level.  Here, we repeat the same search but drop the validity constraint.  
For CIT, it turns out the validity constraint does not bind (i.e., for the instrument set with the 
highest first-stage fit, the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at the 10% level or below.)  
For ITC, the constraint does bind.  Replacing  *
,i,t z  in our baseline IV regressions with the 
instrument set with the highest first-stage fit (not conditioned on satisfying the validity 
constraint), we get similar results to those reported in Table 1.  Specifically, the estimated  in 
our preferred three-lag specification is -0.407 (standard error of 0.141), compared with the   
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estimate in Table 1 of -0.588 (standard error of 0.170).  In sum, our key finding of a negatively 
sloped reaction function is not due to imposing the validity constraint in our instrument selection 
procedure.
17   
 
C.  Extensions  
This subsection extends the core analysis by considering three additional measures of 
capital tax policy and an alternative weighting scheme for constructing foreign state tax policy. 
  The first additional measure of capital tax policy we consider is the tax wedge on capital 
(TWC).  All of the above analyses have measured  i,t   using one of two statutory tax policies, the 
investment tax credit rate or the corporate income tax rate.  The TWC allows us to examine their 
combined effects by focusing on that part of the user cost of capital that incorporates both of 
these policies (see fn. 1 and Appendix A for details).  Estimates of the benchmark model but 
using TWC as the tax variable are presented in panel A of Table 7.  The key patterns that we 
observed previously in Table 3 remain with TWC:  models without aggregate effects or time lags 
of  f
i,t   generate positive ’s and the introduction of aggregate effects and time lags generates 
negative ’s that are statistically different from zero at conventional levels.   
The second additional tax policy measure is the average corporate tax rate ( i,t ACT ).  As 
we argue in more detail in Section VI below, statutory policies are the appropriate variables of 
interest in tax competition because they are the tax instruments that policymakers control 
directly.   The average corporate tax rate, on the other hand, measures tax revenues divided by a 
tax base and are largely beyond the control of policymakers.  Though policymakers’ choices 
regarding statutory policies influence this average rate, current economic conditions and other 
exogenous factors, especially the firm’s choice of organization form, also have a substantial 
influence.
18  Nonetheless, because average tax rate measures are often used in the empirical tax 
competition literature, we present results in panel B of Table 7 based a measure of  i,t ACT  in 
                                                 
17 Indeed, out of 1003 candidate instrument sets for the ITC model, 95.2% yield a negative and 
statistically significant ; none yields a positive and statistically significant .    
 
18 Regarding the sensitivity of organization form to corporate taxation, see Goolsbee (2004), Mackie-
Mason and Gordon (1997), and Mooij and Nicodème (2008) for evidence across U.S. states, U.S. 
industries, and EU firms, respectively.   
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order to draw comparisons with some of the previous literature.  The  i,t ACT  is the ratio of state 
tax revenues from corporate taxes to total state business income, the latter measured by gross 
operating surplus. 
The  i,t ACT  results are mixed relative to the estimates based on statutory tax rates.  
Focusing on the CCE results, we find that the estimated slope of the reaction function based on 
the  i,t ACT  is positive in a static model.   Many prior studies have been based on average tax 
variables in static models, and the results in Table 7 may partly explain why positively sloped 
reaction functions have been found previously.  As with the benchmark model, the addition of 
one or two lagged values of  f
i,t   yields negative slopes.  However, the results are fragile; the 
addition of a third or fourth lag leads to a sign reversal and much larger estimated slope.  These 
results suggest that there can be a great deal of difference in estimated reaction function slopes 
when tax policy is measured by marginal and average tax rates, a finding consistent with the 
evaluation of statutory and average tax rates by Plesko (2003).   
We next consider another important, but less well-known, capital tax policy used by U.S. 
states, the Capital Apportionment Weight.  The CAW is the weight that a state assigns to capital 
(property) in its formula for allocating a portion of a corporation’s national income to that state.
19  
Unlike the ITC and CIT, changes in the CAW are somewhat difficult to interpret because an 
increase in the capital weight necessarily implies a decrease in the weights for the non-capital 
components in the apportionment formula; the net effect on incentives depends on the relative 
importance of capital and non-capital factors.  With this caveat, the results for the capital 
apportionment weight are shown in Panel C of Table 7.  Again, the introduction of time lags of 
the tax competition variable, combined with controlling for aggregate shocks, results in a sign 
                                                 
19 In the United States, for the purposes of determining corporate income tax liability in a given state, 
corporations that do business in multiple states must apportion their national income to each state using 
formulary apportionment.  The apportionment formula is always a weighted average of the company’s 
sales, payroll, and property (with zero weights allowed).  However, the weights in this formula vary by 
state, and there is no coordination among states.  As shown in Figure 4, over the last forty years, states 
have increasingly moved toward increasing the weight on sales and decreasing the weights on payroll and 
property as a way to encourage job creation and investment in their state (and “export” the tax burden to 
foreign state business owners that sell goods and services in-state but employ workers and capital out-of-
state).  The capital (property) weight can be thought of as a capital tax instrument with similar effects as 
the corporate income tax, though it receives relatively much less attention by the public than the CIT. 
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flip of the long-run reaction function slope from positive to negative.  The absolute values of the 
slope point estimates for CAW are much larger than those for ITC or CIT.  These results strongly 
suggest that the slope of the reaction function for CAW is negative and that, as with ITC and 
CIT, including time lags of the tax competition variable and controlling for aggregate shocks are 
important elements in a properly specified econometric equation.  
Lastly, we investigate whether our baseline results are sensitive to our definition of the 
foreign state tax policy by repeating our main regressions using an alternative weighting matrix 
(cf. equation (15)) to form the foreign state tax variable,  f
i,t  .  How states react to tax policy 
changes in other states most likely depends on exactly what other states are considered to be 
competing for the same mobile capital tax base.  In all of the above results,  f
i,t   was constructed 
as a weighted average of other states’ tax policies using geographic proximity weights (the 
inverse of the distance between population centroids).  However, state capital tax policy may not 
be particularly sensitive to tax policies of other states that are geographically close, but may be 
more sensitive to policies of states that are “economically close.”  To measure economic 
closeness, we define the weighting matrix based on commodity trade flows; that is, state j’s 
weight in state i’s tax competition variable is proportional to the value of commodity shipments 
from state i to state j.  The results discussed here are based on the three-lag specification and the 
efficient CCE estimator.  For the ITC, the slope coefficient falls (in absolute value) from -0.588 
(s.e. = 0.170) for the baseline results in Table 3 to -0.357 (s.e. = 0.081) but remains statistically 
significant.  A negative slope is also obtained for CIT, as the coefficient estimate rises in 
absolute value from -0.077 (s.e. = 0.192) to -0.428 (s.e. = 0.172); the latter estimate based on 
trade flow weights is statistically significant at conventional levels.   
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VI.  Comparison to Previous Empirical Studies 
 
The empirical literature on fiscal competition has grown considerably in recent years, 
though the policy focus and methodologies used differ widely across studies.  Among studies of 
“horizontal” (same level of government) competition, studies vary in whether they focus on 
expenditure policy or tax policy, and among tax policy studies, some focus on business taxes and 
some on consumer/personal taxes (see Brueckner (2003) and Zodrow (2010) for surveys).  In 
terms of our policy focus on business taxes, the current  paper is most closely related to Overesch 
and Rincke (2009), Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) and, to a lesser extent, Altschuler 
and Goodspeed (2002) and Hayashi and Boadway (2001).  All of these papers, except Overesch 
and Rincke, estimate a static model for some measure of corporate tax policy.  All find that the 
slope of the reaction function is positive, as do we when we use the static model or omit controls 
for aggregate effects.
20     
Overesch and Rincke estimate a tax competition model using panel data on corporate 
income tax rates for EU countries.  They control for time and country fixed effects, though they 
do not allow for common correlated effects.  Similar to our results, they find that the estimated 
slope of the reaction function is positively biased if one omits time effects.  However, while 
reduced, their estimated slope parameters remain positive after the addition of time fixed effects.  
A more significant difference in methodology between Overesch and Rincke and the current 
paper is the manner in which dynamics are modeled.  Based on a partial adjustment model, 
Overesch and Rincke capture dynamics with a lagged dependent variable, which restricts the 
sign of the long-run effect to be the same as the sign of short-run effect.
21  Our more general 
estimator allows for sign flipping among the coefficients on the various time lags (including the 
                                                 
20 Empirically estimated reaction functions with negative slopes are rarely found in the economics 
literature.  The only exception about which we are aware is the study by Büttner and Schwager (2004, 
equation (17) and Table 3) of higher education finance among German regions.   
 
21 This restriction can be seen by considering the formula for the long-run effect of a given variable in a 
lagged dependent variable model.  The coefficient on any independent variable, call it  0  , represents the 
short-run effect of that variable.  The long-run effect is given by  0 /( 1 )   , where ρ is the coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable and should be between 0.0 and 1.0.  Thus, the long-run effect will always 
have the same sign as the short-run effect in a model that captures dynamics only with a lagged dependent 
variable.  See Section V.B and Appendix C for further discussion.  
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0-lag) of the foreign state tax variable.  Such sign flipping occurs in our data and proves 
important for accurately estimating the reaction function slope. 
An important contribution of our paper is to document the sensitivity of estimated 
reaction function slopes to the tax variable.  Our preferred specification uses statutory tax 
variables because they are directly chosen by policymakers.  Motivated by a tax competition 
model in which both capital and corporate income are mobile (the latter via transfer pricing), 
Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) estimate a two-equation system with the statutory 
corporate income tax rate and the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) on capital as dependent 
variables.  For 21 OECD countries, they find a positive and significant slope for the statutory rate 
but a small and insignificant slope for the EMTR.  These results are broadly consistent with our 
results for U.S. states when we estimate a similar static specification (cf. Table 3 (for ITC and 
CIT) and Panel A of Table 7 (for TWC)).  Altschuler and Goodspeed (2002) and Hayashi and 
Boadway (2001) are somewhat less comparable to our study because they estimate reaction 
functions for the average effective corporate income tax rate – corporate income tax revenues 
divided by total corporate income (or GDP in Altschuler and Goodspeed) – rather than for 
statutory tax rates.  Our results in Panel B of Table 7 suggest that there can be a great deal of 
difference in estimated reaction function slopes when tax policy is measured by marginal and 
average tax rates.  The key distinction between these three papers and ours is that none of them 
allows for lagged responses to foreign state tax policies or for common aggregate time effects.   
There are several papers that estimate models of other forms of fiscal competition as 
well.  These also typically do not control for aggregate time effects or lagged responses.  Egger, 
Pfaffermayr, and Winner (2005a, b), Besley and Case (1995), and Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993) 
use panel data to estimate static models, and all of these papers report a positively sloped 
reaction function.  Among these papers, only Egger, Praffermayr, and Winner and Case, Rosen, 
and Hines include both jurisdictional and time fixed effects, but they do not allow for lagged 
responses.  Revelli (2002), Brueckner and Savaadra (2001), and Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) 
estimate cross-section models, and they too report reaction functions with positive slopes.  The 
main methodological differences between our paper and the studies discussed in this paragraph 
are our inclusion of both time fixed effects and a distributed time lag of tax policy in foreign 
states.  Though most of these studies look at different measures of fiscal policy then we do, our 
empirical findings suggest that the positive reaction function slopes found in these studies may   
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be upwardly biased due to the omission of time fixed effects or the restriction to only 
contemporaneous responses.
22   
 
 
VII.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper estimates a capital tax reaction function motivated by strategic tax competition 
theory.  We estimate this model using state panel data from 1965-2006 for several measures of 
capital tax policy.  Our key empirical findings are that the slope of the reaction function for the 
investment tax credit (ITC) is negative and statistically different from zero and the slope of the 
reaction function for the corporate income tax (CIT) is negative but not statistically different 
from zero.  These findings are consistent with the implications of our theoretical model that 1) 
the slope of the reaction function can be positive, negative, or zero depending on a key elasticity 
and 2) tax policies targeting new, more mobile capital like the ITC should have a larger reaction 
function slope than policies targeting total (new and old) capital.  We document that including 
time lags of foreign state tax policy and conditioning on aggregate shocks are vitally important in 
accurately estimating this slope.  The results prove robust in several dimensions, including 
defining tax policy in terms of the capital apportionment weight (CAW) or the tax wedge on 
capital (TWC).   
While these results are striking given prior findings in the literature and the casual 
observation that state capital tax rates, on the whole, have fallen over time, these results are not 
surprising.  The negative sign is fully consistent with qualitative and quantitative implications of 
the theoretical model developed in this paper.  The model illustrates how, if state residents prefer 
that positive state income shocks disproportionately be spent on private goods versus public 
goods, a state may react to a tax increase in a foreign state (or more precisely, to the income 
                                                 
22 All of the above papers are drawn from the economics literature.  Tax competition and reaction 
functions have also been studied in the political science literature.  Hanson (1993) concludes that 
“competition from neighboring states has little impact on development choices.”  Mooney (2001) argues 
that most prior empirical studies of the policy diffusion process among states are biased upward because 
they do not control for aggregate time effects.  He then shows that the reaction function slope for states’ 
decisions to adopt a personal income tax turns from positive and significant to either small and 
insignificant or negative, depending on the exact specification, when aggregate time effects enter the 
econometric equation.    
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windfall resulting from the tax-induced capital inflow from the foreign state) by reducing its own 
tax rate.  The model highlights the crucial role played by the income elasticity of private goods 
relative to public goods.  Suppose that this elasticity is positive.  If a foreign state increases its 
tax rate, the resulting capital inflow and income windfall into the home state will increase the 
demand for private goods at the expense of public goods and lead to a reduction in the home 
state tax rate.  This income windfall allows residents to reduce their tax rate and increase their 
private good consumption without sacrificing public services.  The same logic applies in reverse 
for a decrease in the foreign state tax and the resulting capital outflow.  Our empirical findings 
suggest that, while state capital taxation has eased dramatically in recent decades, the downward 
pressure is not coming from tax competition – i.e., how states respond to each other – but from 
aggregate shocks impacting all states in more or less the same way.  Rather than states “racing to 
the bottom,” which suggests a competition in which participants respond to each other’s 
movements in the same direction, our findings suggest that state tax competition is better 
characterized by “riding on a seesaw.” 
An important implication of this result is that calls for legislative, judicial, or regulatory 
actions aimed at restricting tax competition as a means of stemming the fall in state capital tax 
revenue or the mobility of capital are likely misguided.  In fact, similar calls in the European 
Union might also be inappropriate.
23  If aggregate shocks, and not tax competition, are driving 
the secular trends in capital taxation, both in the U.S. and Europe, attenuating tax competition 
will do little to stop or reverse these trends.
24  
  The finding of a negative-sloping capital tax reaction function has several implications 
for the strategic tax competition models.  First, the non-zero slope provides support for the 
empirical importance of strategic tax competition relative to other factors in tax setting behavior.  
The finding is a rejection of both the hypothesis that capital is immobile and the hypothesis that 
                                                 
23 Sutter (2007, p. 124) argues that the Code of Conduct for business taxation was adopted by the EC 
Commission in 1997 in light of an “intense discussion about unfair tax competition among OECD and EC 
Member States in the late 1990s showing that national tax individualism ultimately leads to a harsh fiscal 
race to the bottom in attracting ‘mobile’ foreign industries and businesses.”   
  
24 That is not to say that there are not other unrelated arguments for restricting tax competition.  In 
particular, the canonical strategic tax competition models of Oates (1972), Zodrow and Mieszkowski 
(1986), and Wilson (1986) and others yield an equilibrium with sub-optimally low taxes and public 
services, irrespective of the slope of the reaction function.    
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the supply of capital to the nation is perfectly elastic; either hypothesis implies a zero slope to the 
reaction function.  Second, multi-stage or Stackelberg models of tax competition rely on a 
positively sloped reaction function for several results (Konrad and Schjelderup, 1999).  The 
negatively sloped reaction function documented in this paper raises concerns about the existence, 
stability, and uniqueness of equilibrium in these classes of models.   
The negative slope also suggests that the theory of yardstick competition, a leading 
alternative theory of fiscal strategic interaction and one that predicts a positive-sloping reaction 
function, is either not an important force in the setting of capital tax policy or is dominated by 
the force of tax competition.
25  Future research in this field might well focus on whether similar 
methodological improvements as those employed in this paper could unearth evidence of 
negative sloping reaction functions in other areas of fiscal policy, such as personal taxation, in 
which yardstick competition is likely to be a stronger force. 
  
                                                 
25 A negatively sloped reaction function allow us to avoid the observational equivalence problem between 
yardstick and tax competition noted by Revelli (2005).  
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*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION *** 
 
Appendix A:  Variable Definitions and Data Sources
26  
 
  This appendix describes the construction of and data sources for the variables used in this 
study:   
 
1.  ACT:  Average Corporate Tax Rate. 
2.  CAW:  Capital Apportionment Weight. 
3.  CIT:  Corporate Income Tax Rate. 
4.  I/K:  Investment/Capital Ratio. 
5.  ITC:  Investment Tax Credit Rate.   
6.  PREFERENCES:  Voter Preferences.   
7.  POPULATION:  Population. 
8.  TD:  Tax Depreciation. 
9.  TWC:  Tax wedge on capital. 
10.  i,j  :  Spatial Lag Weights.  
 
The series are for the 48 contiguous states (indexed by subscript s) for the period 1963 to 2006 
(indexed by subscript t), unless otherwise noted.
27  Each of the above series is described in a 
separate section. The general organizing principle for each section is to first define each of the 
series mentioned above and then discuss its components.  For each component, general issues 
concerning the construction of the series (if pertinent) and then data sources are discussed.  
Section 11 contains a Legend with abbreviations and sources.  
 
                                                 
26 In describing the raw data, we have taken some of the text in this data appendix directly from 
government publications. 
 
27 The most notable exception is that the Annual Survey of Manufacturers was not conducted from 1979 
to 1981.     
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1.  ACT:  Average Corporate Tax Rate 
 
  The average corporate tax rate is measured as follows, 
  
   CIT
i,t i,t i,t ACT REV GOS  , 
 
where  i,t GOS  is state private gross operating surplus and CIT
i,t REV is state government revenues 
from the corporate income tax. 




2.  CAW:  Capital Apportionment Weight 
 
  The capital apportionment weight (CAW) is the weight that the state assigns to capital 
(property) in its formula apportioning income among the multiple states in which firms generate 
taxable income.  The apportionment formula is always a weighted average of the company’s 
sales, payroll, and property (with zero weights allowed).  However, the weights vary by state.  In 
practice, the payroll and property weights are always equal, at least for the states and years in our 
sample, so that knowing one of the three weights for a state reveals the other two.   
  We construct data from 1963 – 2006 on the factor apportionment weights for each of the 
48 contiguous states.  We use a number of different sources.  OMER provides information on the 
year in which each state first deviated from the traditional three-factor, equal weighting formula.  
Kelly Edmiston kindly provided data on apportionment weights for years 1997 and 2001 used in 
CESW.  John Deskins kindly provided data panel data for 1985-2003 used in BDF.  Lastly, we 
were able to obtain weights for various years from STH.  
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3.  CIT:  Corporate Income Tax Rate 
  
The effective corporate income tax rate at the state level ( E,S
i,t  ) is lower than the 
legislated (or statutory) corporate income tax rate ( L,S
t  ) due to the deductibility (in some states) 
against state taxable income of taxes paid to the federal government.
28  Some states allow full 
deductibility of federal corporate income taxes from state taxable income; Iowa and Missouri 
allow only 50% deductibility; and some states allow no deductibility at all.  The deductibility 
provision in state tax codes is represented by  i,t {1.0,0.5,0.0}   , and the provisional effective 
corporate income tax rate at the state level ( #,E,S
i,t  ) is as follows, 
 
   
#,E,S L,S #,E,F
i,t t i,t i,t 1     . 
 
The effect of federal income tax deducibility is represented by the provisional effective corporate 
income tax rate at the federal level ( #,E,F
i,t  , defined below). 
 The  L,S
i,t i,t and   series are obtained from several sources.  For recent years, data are 
obtained primarily from various issues of BOTS and STH, as well as actual state tax forms.  Data 
for earlier years are obtained from various issues of BOTS and SFFF.  Additional information 
has been provided by TAXFDN.  Many states have multiple legislated tax rates that increase 
stepwise with taxable income; we measure  L,S
i,t   with the marginal legislated tax rate for the 
highest income bracket.  
  The effective corporate income tax rate at the federal level is lower than the legislated 
corporate income tax rate ( L,F
t  ) due to the deductibility against federal taxable income of taxes 
paid to the state.  The provisional effective corporate income tax rate at the federal level is as 
follows, 
 
                                                 
28 In “corporate income” taxes we also include Texas’ “franchise” tax, which has a very similar tax base 
as the traditional corporate income tax base.   
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   
#,E,F L,F #,E,S
t i,t i,t 1     
 
The effect of state income tax deducibility is represented by the effective corporate income tax 
rate at the state level.  The  L,F
t   series is obtained from GRAVELLE, Table 2.1. Our database 
presents  L,F
t   in percentage points.  
  It has not generally been recognized that, owing to deductibility of taxes paid to another 
level of government, the effective corporate income tax rates at the state and federal levels are 
functionally related to each other.  As shown in the above equations, these interrelationships 
yield two equations in two unknowns, and thus can be solved for the effective corporate income 
tax rates at the state and federal levels, respectively, as follows, 
 
   E,S L,S L,F L,S L,F
i,t i,t tt i,t i,t i,t 11                , 
   E,F L,F L,S L,S L,F
i,t tt i,t i,t i,t 11               . 
 
The overall corporate income tax rate is the sum of  E,S E,F
i,t i,t and   .  In the limiting case where 
federal corporate income taxes are not deductible against state taxable income ( i,t 0 ), this 
sum reduces to the more frequently used formula,   
L,S L,S L,F
t i,t i,t 1     .   
 
 
4.  I/K:  Investment/Capital Ratio 
 
  As a measure of investment demand, as well as overall economic activity in a state, we 
use the state’s investment-capital ratio.  We extend data on this ratio used in Chirinko and 
Wilson (2008), which cover 1963 – 2004, through 2006.  The primary raw source data is the 
Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.  State-level 
totals (which the Census Bureau refers to as “AS-3” data) are reported in the yearly volumes of 
the ASM publication.  From 1994 onward, these data also can be found in the yearly ASM   
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Geographic Area Statistics (ASM-GAS) publications.  Hereafter, we will refer to the ASM data 
on state-level totals for all years as the ASM-GAS data.  The ASM data are collected from a 
large, representative sample of manufacturing establishments with one or more paid employees.  
The ASM manufacturing sector corresponds to NAICS sectors 31 to 33.    
4.1  The Capital Stock  --   i,t K  
 The  i,t K  series is measured by the real (constant-cost) replacement value of equipment 
(excluding software) and structures, and this series is constructed from the following perpetual 
inventory formula, 
  
   t 1981
i,t i,1981 mfg,t i,t K K (1 ) t 1982,...,T I      , 
  
where  i,1981 K  is the initial (1981) value of the real capital stock,  mfg,t   is the geometric rate of 
economic depreciation (hence  mfg,t (1 )   is the survival rate), and  i,t I  is real total capital 
expenditure.  The capital stock is dated end-of-period (EOP).  Each component determining the 
capital stock is discussed in the following subsections.   
4.2  The Initial Value Of The Capital Stock  --   i,1981 K  
 The  i,1981 K  series is measured by the book value of the capital stock adjusted for 
inflation, 
 
   
BV CoC HC
i,1981 i,1981 mfg,1981 mfg,1981 KK * K / K  , 
 
where  BV
i,1981 K  is the book value (historical-cost) of the capital stock for state i,  CoC
mfg,1981 K i s  t h e  
constant-cost value of the capital stock for the manufacturing sector, and  HC
mfg,1981 K  is the 
historical-cost value of the capital stock for the manufacturing sector.  All capital stock series are 
end-of-period.  Inflation drives a wedge between book value capital stocks (based on the original 
purchase cost of investment) and real capital stocks useful in economic analyses.  The 

CoC HC
mfg,1981 mfg,1981 K/ K  ratio provides an approximate adjustment for the inflation wedge based   
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on national manufacturing industry data. 
The  BV
i,1981 K  series is obtained from ASM.  The  CoC
mfg, K  series is the product of a quantity 
index and a base year value that converts the index into a real stock,   
 
   CoC CoC CuC
mfg,1981 mfg,1981 mfg,2000 KI N D E X K * K  ,  
 
where  CoC
mfg,1981 INDEXK  is the 1981 value of the chain-type quantity index for the real capital 
stock and  CuC
mfg,2000 K  is the base year (2000) value for the current-cost value of the capital stock 
for the manufacturing sector.  The  CoC
mfg,1981 INDEXK  is obtained from FIXED, Table 4.2, line 7, 
and this series is divided by 100.  The  CuC
mfg,2000 K  datapoint is obtained from FIXED, Table 4.1, 
line 7.  The  HC
mfg,1981 K  series is obtained from FIXED, Table 4.3, line 7.    
4.3.  The Rate Of Economic Depreciation  –   mfg,t δ  
 The  mfg,t   series is measured by the flow of annual depreciation divided by the capital 









 ,          
where  CuC
mfg,t D  is the current-cost flow of depreciation in manufacturing industries and  CuC
mfg,t 1 K   
is the current-cost capital stock in manufacturing industries.  The  CuC
mfg,t D  series is obtained from 
FIXED, Table 4.4, line 7.  The  CuC
mfg,t 1 K   series is obtained from FIXED, Table 4.1, line 7.  See 
FRAUMENI for an excellent introduction to the theoretical and empirical literature on economic 
depreciation and JORGENSON-2 for an analysis showing that, even if capital depreciates 
according to a non-geometric pattern, long-run replacement requirements tend to a geometric 
pattern.     
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4.4.  Real Total Capital Expenditure  –   i,t I   











   NEW USED
i,t i,t i,t I$ I$ I$   , 
 
where  i,t I$ ,  NEW
i,t I$ , and  USED
i,t I$  are total, new, and used nominal capital expenditures, 
respectively, and  I
mfg,t P  is the price deflator for investment for the manufacturing sector.  The 
i,t I$  and  I
mfg,t P  series are discussed in the following subsections.  
4.4.1.  Total Nominal Capital Expenditure  –   i,t I$  
 The  i,t I$  series represents nominal expenditures on equipment (excluding software) and 
structures.  The series is obtained directly from ASM-GAS (e.g, in 2004, the data are published 
in Table 2, column I).
29 
4.4.2.  Price Deflator For Investment  –   I
mfg,t P 











where  mfg,t I$  and  mfg,t I  are nominal and real total capital expenditures, respectively, for the 
                                                 
29 We uncovered an obvious data error in the ASM regarding nominal capital expenditures in 1996 for 
Ohio and the sum-of-states national total.  Ohio published value was over 400% of Ohio’s typical levels 
and the resulting national total was inconsistent with the national total published in the alternative ASM 
publication, ASM-SIGI.  We filled in the 1996 Ohio data point by simply taking national manufacturing 
capital expenditures from the alternative ASM publication, ASM-SIGI, and subtracting the sum of capital 
expenditures from all other states.   
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manufacturing sector.  
 The  mfg,t I  series is the product of a quantity index and a base year value that converts 
the index into real investment expenditures, 
 
   mfg,t mfg,t mfg,t 2000 I INDEXI *I$   , 
 
where  mfg,t INDEXI  is the chain-type quantity index for real investment expenditures and 
mfg,t 2000 I$   the base year value for current investment expenditures.  The  mfg,t INDEXI  is 
obtained from FIXED, Table 4.8, line 7, and this series is divided by 100. 
 
 
5.  ITC:  Investment tax credit rate 
  
  The state investment tax credit is a credit against state corporate income tax liabilities.  In 
general, the effective amount of the investment tax credit is simply the legislated investment tax 
credit rate ( L,S
i,t ITC ) multiplied by the value of capital expenditures put into place within the state 
in a tax year.  The effective rate is lower than the legislated rate in a handful of states for two 
reasons.  First, five states (Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, North Carolina, and Ohio) permit the state 
investment tax credit to be applied only to equipment.  Since equipment investment is 
approximately 85% of ASM total national investment, we multiply  L,S
i,t ITC  by 0.85 for these five 
states.  Second, states generally require basis adjustments deducting the amount of the credit 
from the asset basis for depreciation purposes; this adjustment is considered in the subsection on 
the Present Value of Tax Depreciation Allowances.   
  We extend the 1963-2004 state panel data on  L,S
i,t ITC  from Chirinko and Wilson (2008) 
through 2006.  The original and extended data are obtained directly from states’ online corporate 
tax forms and instructions.  For most states with an investment tax credit, both current and 
historical credit rates are provided in the current year instructions (since companies applying for 
a credit based on some past year’s investment apply that year’s credit rate rather than the current   
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rate).  In those few cases where some or all historical rates were missing from the online forms 
and instructions, the missing rates are obtained via direct communication with the state’s 
department of taxation.  In some states, the legislated investment tax credit rate varies by the 




6.  PREFERENCES:  Voter Preferences 
 
Voter preferences are measured by political outcomes.  Specifically, we measure the 
following two political outcomes as indicator variables:   
 
(a)  the governor is Republican (R).  (The complementary class of politicians is  
Democrat (D) or Independent (I).  An informal examination of the political landscape 
suggests that Independents tend to be more closely aligned with the Democratic 
Party.  We thus treat D or I politicians as belonging to the same class, DI); 
 
  (b)  the majority of both houses of the legislature are R; 
 
 
The PREFERENCES variable takes on one of three values:   
 
0  if the governor and the majority of both houses of the legislature are not R; 
 
1/2   if the governor is R but the majority of both houses of the legislature are not R 
  or if the governor is not R but the majority of both houses of the legislature are R; 
 
1   if the governor and the majority of both houses of the legislature are R. 
 
Data for these political variables come from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S. 
Census Bureau (Various Years)).   
 
         51
 
7.  POPULATION:  Population 
 
  Population  data are obtained from CENSUS. 
 
 
8.  TD:  Tax Depreciation 
  
Tax depreciation allowances accrue over the useful life of the asset.  We have assumed 
that the present value of tax depreciation allowances,  i,t TD , is 0.70 for all s and t.  We assume a 
slightly lower value than the average across asset types and years reported in GRAVELLE to 
adjust for the basis reduction by the amount of investment tax credits taken. 
 
 
9.  TWC:  Tax Wedge on Capital 
   The price of capital (tax-adjusted) is defined as the product of three objects reflecting the 
purchase price of the capital good, the opportunity costs of holding depreciating capital, and 
taxes.  This latter term comprises tax credits, tax deductions, and the tax rate on income, and we 














In this paper, we define  i,t TWC  only in terms of state tax variables.   
Note that the user cost of capital, which was introduced by JORGENSON-1 in 1963 and 
extended by, among others, HALL-JORGENSON, GRAVELLE, JORGENSON-YUN, and 
KING-FULLERTON, equals the price of capital divided by the price of output.    
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10.   i,j  :  Spatial Lag Weights 
The spatial lag weights are measured by the distance between state population centroids 
(data are from CENSUS) and by commodity trade flows (data are from TRANSPORT). 
 
 
11.  Legend 
 
ASM: CENSUS,  Annual Survey of Manufactures, Complete Volume (Various 
Years).   
 
ASM-GAS:   CENSUS,  Annual Survey of Manufacturers, Geographic AreaStatistics  
   (Various  Years).    Publications for the years 1994 to 2004 (except 1997  
      and 2002) are available online.  These data are published on an  
      establishment basis.  The data are obtained from electronic or paper  
      documents depending on the time period:  2004 (Census website);  
      2003 to 1972 (CD's purchased from Census); 1971 to 1963 
(paper copies).  URL:  http://www.census.gov/mcd/asm-as3.html. 
 
ASM-SIGI:   CENSUS,  Annual Survey of Manufacturers, Statistics for Industry  
Groups and Industries (1996).  
URL:  http://www.census.gov/mcd/asm-as1.html. 
 
BDF:  Bruce, Donald, Deskins, John, and Fox, William F., “On The Extent, 
Growth, and Efficiency Consequences of State Business Tax Planning,” 
mimeo, University of Tennessee, 2005.  
 
BOTS:     The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States (The  
Council of State Governments : Lexington, Kentucky, Various Issues).  
 
CBP:    CENSUS,  County Business Patterns. 
URL:  http://www.census.gov/epcd/cbp/download/cbpdownload.html.  
 
CENSUS:    Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce.   
   U R L :     http://www.census.gov.      
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*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION *** 
 
Appendix B:  Analytic Details – Properties Of The Capital Mobility Function And 
                        The Existence Of An Equilibrium Tax Rate, * 
  This appendix provides some analytic details concerning the properties of the capital 
mobility function (equation (2)) and the existence of an equilibrium tax rate,  *  . 
 
A.  Properties of the Capital Mobility Function 
  The capital mobility function used in this paper (equation (2)) allows for the possibility 
that, owing to a variety of frictions, the net-of-tax returns on capital may differ across 
jurisdictions.  This sub-section demonstrates that the capital mobility function is consistent with 
the standard constraint on net-of-tax return equalization across jurisdictions.  Equation (2) is 
reproduced here as follows, 
 
    ff
kk KK [ , : x , x ]   ,           ( B - 1 )  
       f K [.] K [.] 0     . 
 
The relation between the net-of tax returns in the home and foreign jurisdictions is as follows,  
 
    ff (1 ) F'[K] (1 ) (1 ) '[K ]      ,         ( B - 2 )  
   1   , 
 
where  is a wedge that represents a variety of frictions that prevent equalization of net-of-tax 
returns across jurisdictions,  f '[K ]   is the production function for the foreign jurisdiction, and 
the production functions for both jurisdictions are subject to the Inada conditions (which 
guarantee that equation (B-2) will hold for some capital allocation).   We assume that there is a 
fixed amount of capital (K ) that is allocated between the home and foreign jurisdictions, 
 
    f KK K   .            ( B - 3 )  
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Substituting equation (B-3) into (B-2), differentiating the resulting expression by K, , and  f  , and 
rearranging, we obtain the following derivatives, 
 
   
f
dK F'[.] (1 )
K[ . ] 0




     
,    (B-4a) 
 
    f
ff
dK '[.]
K[ . ] 0




       
,      ( B - 4 b )  
 
where we have assumed that the production functions exhibit diminishing marginal products 
(F"[.] 0  ," [ . ]0  ). 
 
B.  The Existence Of An Equilibrium Tax Rate, 
*   
  We analyze a symmetric equilibrium between home and foreign jurisdictions.  We begin 
with the three relations that summarize the content of the theoretical model presented in Section 
II.A,  
 
    ff ff
kk kk y F [ K ] F K [ ,: x , x ] G [ ,: x , x ]          ,       ( B - 5 )  
   f G [.] 0, G [.] 0.      
 
   c/g / 1 H[ ]   ,           ( B - 6 )  
   
f (1 )/ 1 (provided 0.5)        ,    
H[ . ] 0   . 
 
    
,y ff c/g [y( 1 ):x ] y( 1 ) ,
 
              ( B - 7 )  
   cc gg /,        
   ,y c g 0.           
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where equation (B-5) is equation (3) representing the production function and the mobile capital 
stock, equation (B-6) is equation (7) representing the aggregate and government budget 
constraints, and equation (B-7) is equation (9) representing optimizing choices of private and 
public goods.   
  Under the symmetry assumption, no capital flows between jurisdictions (cf. equation   
(B-2) under symmetry and with  0  ).  Thus, equation (B-5) implies that the level of output in 
each country is constant, yy  .  Substituting this constant into equation (B-7) and eliminating 
c/g with equation (B-6), we obtain the following solution for the equilibrium tax rate,  *   
 








/* 1 y ( 1 ) ,





    

       

         ( B - 8 )  
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Appendix C:  Notes on the Specification of Dynamic Models  
 
  This appendix provides the details supporting our discussion in Section V.B that (1) the 
standard lagged dependent variable (LDV) model is nested within a more general dynamic 
model that includes no LDV but an infinite number of time lags of the independent variables and 
(2) a restricted version of this latter model can be estimated by including N lags of the 
independent variables and the N+1
st lag of the LDV. 
   An “expanded” specification of our preferred model includes lags of all independent 
variables and is written as follows,  
 
   

N




              ( C - 1 )  
 
where one of the variables in the x vector is the spatial lag of τ and N can go to infinity.  (Note 
state subscripts have been omitted for expositional convenience.)  Equation (C-1) is more general 
than our preferred specification (equations (17), (19), or (21)) because it contains additional lags.  
Equation (17) can be obtained from equation (C-1) by setting  n 0    for n1  .     
Now consider the lagged dependent variable (LDV) model: 
 
    tt 1 tt x         ,           ( C - 2 )  
    
where  t   is an error term.  The LDV can be eliminated by lagging this equation one period and 
substituting it into equation (C-2).  The resulting equation contains the regressors  t x,   t1 x, a n d   
t2   .  The latter variable is eliminated by repeating the above procedure by lagging this 
transformed equation one period.  If the procedure is repeated up to the N+1
st period, we obtain 
the following equation,      
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   .           ( C - 3 c )  
  
The only important difference between our preferred model (equation (C-1)) and the 
LDV model (equation (C-3)) is the LDV term  N1
tN

 .  (The less important differences 
involve redefining the coefficient vector on the x variables (equation (C-3b)) and the serial 
correlation in the error term (equation (C-3c).)  The central point is that what we are omitting 
from our model is NOT last year’s tax policy (τt-1), since the effects of this term are captured by 
the one-year lags of the x variables (and lagged error terms), but rather a term capturing the 
determinants of tax policy lagged more than N periods in the past.  (The serial correlation in the 
error term does not pose any bias problems as long as the x variables are exogenous or 
instrumented.)   
As N goes to infinity,  N1    goes to zero, and the LDV term vanishes.   It is in this sense 
that the LDV model is nested within a more general model with an infinite number of lags of 
tn x  .  In practice, the question of whether our omission of the LDV term from our estimating 
equation poses any problem depends on how far back lags of  tn x   could reasonably be expected 
to affect tax policy.  The results presented in the paper for models without an LDV are based on 
a maximum lag of N=4.  However, we also have estimated a model in which we set N=3 and 
then include the dependent variable lagged four periods (i.e., the term  31
t31

  .  These results 
are discussed briefly in Section V.B.     
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Table 1 
Tax Policy (τ):  Investment Tax Credit Rate (“New Capital”) 
Common Correlated Effects Pooled (CCE) IV Estimator and  
Various Time Lags of Tax Competition Variable 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E) 
  Number of Time Lags of  f
i,t  : 
  0 1 2 3 4 
A.  Competitive States Tax Variable       
f
i,t   
1.301 -1.309 -1.572 -1.473 -1.499 
(0.059) (0.497) (0.502) (0.462) (0.469) 
       
f
i,t 1     ------  0.732 0.578 0.527 0.548 
(0.474) (0.551) (0.507) (0.515) 
       
f
i,t 2     ------ ------ 0.309 0.047 0.047 
(0.189) (0.266) (0.269) 
       
f
i,t 3     ------ ------ ------ 0.310 0.335 
(0.261) (0.376) 
       
f
i,t 4     ------ ------ ------ ------  -0.028 
(0.270) 
       
  = Sum of Coefficients on the  f
i,t  ’s 
 
1.301 -0.577 -0.686 -0.588 -0.596 
(0.059) (0.146) (0.159) (0.170) (0.175) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
       
B.  Control Variables       
i,t 1 PREFERENCES    0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
i,t 1 IK    0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
i,t POPULATION   -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
f
i,t 1 IK   
0.006 -0.030 -0.038 -0.036 -0.037 
(0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
       
f
i,t POPULATION  
0.019 -0.007 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
       
Cross-Section  Dependence  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
C.  Instrument Assessment       
p-value for test of overidentifying restrictions  0.644  0.820  0.872  0.855  0.801 
Minimum eigenvalue statistic   18.902  15.008  16.884  17.491  16.393 
 
Table Notes After Table 7  
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Table 2 
Tax Policy (τ):  Corporate Income Tax Rate (“Old and New Capital”) 
Common Correlated Effects Pooled (CCE) IV Estimator and 
Various Time Lags of Tax Competition Variable 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E) 
  Number of Time Lags of  f
i,t  : 
  0 1 2 3 4 
A.  Competitive States Tax Variable       
f
i,t   
0.512 0.378 0.569 0.575 0.693 
(0.206) (0.430) (0.470) (0.375) (0.366) 
       
f
i,t 1     ------  -0.382 -0.836 -0.752 -0.843 
(0.431) (0.418) (0.389) (0.385) 
       
f
i,t 2     ------ ------ 0.130 0.392 0.415 
(0.326) (0.500) (0.509) 
       
f
i,t 3     ------ ------ ------  -0.292 -0.022 
(0.293) (0.396) 
       
f
i,t 4     ------ ------ ------ ------  -0.291 
(0.192) 
       
  = Sum of Coefficients on the  f
i,t  ’s 
 
0.512 -0.004 -0.138 -0.077 -0.048 
(0.206) (0.182) (0.210) (0.192) (0.202) 
[0.013] [0.981] [0.513] [0.690] [0.813] 
       
B.  Control Variables       
i,t 1 PREFERENCES    -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
i,t 1 IK    -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
i,t POPULATION   -0.007 -0.020 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
f
i,t 1 IK   
-0.135 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.015 
(0.023) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) 
       
f
i,t POPULATION  
-0.055 -0.031 -0.040 -0.033 -0.035 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
       
Cross-Section  Dependence  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
C.  Instrument Assessment       
p-value for test of overidentifying restrictions  0.292  0.325  0.288  0.304  0.206 
Minimum  eigenvalue  statistic  117.913  39.974 37.007 39.647 34.999 
 
Table Notes After Table 7   
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Table 3 
Estimated Slope of Reaction Function For Each Tax Policy 
( = Sum of Coefficients on the  f
i,t  ’s) 
Various IV Estimators and Time Lags of Tax Competition Variable 
 
Table Notes After Table 7 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E) 
  Number of Time Lags of  f
i,t  : 
  0 1 2 3 4 
A.  Investment Tax Credit Rate 
      “New Capital” 
     
Common Correlated Effects Pooled (CCE)  1.301  -0.577  -0.686  -0.588  -0.596 
(0.059) (0.146) (0.159) (0.170) (0.175) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
       
Two-way Fixed Effects (TFE)  7.534  -1.425  -1.512  -1.584  -1.749 
(2.770) (0.312) (0.370) (0.375) (0.436) 
[0.007] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       
One-way (state) fixed effects (NTFE)  1.670 0.308 0.297 0.285 0.272 
(0.180) (0.115) (0.120) (0.128) (0.139) 
[0.000] [0.007] [0.013] [0.026] [0.050] 
B.  Corporate Income Tax Rate 
      “Old and New Capital” 
   
  
Common Correlated Effects Pooled (CCE)  0.512 -0.004 -0.138 -0.077 -0.048 
(0.206) (0.182) (0.210) (0.192) (0.202) 
[0.013] [0.981] [0.513] [0.690] [0.813] 
       
Two-way Fixed Effects (TFE)  1.418 0.760 0.778 0.781 0.817 
(0.173) (0.809) (0.832) (0.817) (0.818) 
[0.000] [0.347] [0.350] [0.339] [0.318] 
       
One-way (state) fixed effects (NTFE)  1.030 0.767 0.689 0.646 0.566 
(0.133) (0.163) (0.165) (0.170) (0.177) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]   
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Table 4 
Estimated Slope of Reaction Function For Each Tax Policy 
( = Sum of Coefficients on the  f
i,t  ’s) 




(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
  Number of Time Lags of  f
i,t  : 
  0 1 2 3 4 
A.  Investment Tax Credit Rate 
      “New Capital” 
     
CCE-Unrestricted/Inefficient  0.493 -0.916 -0.834 -0.614 -0.428 
(0.812) (0.320) (0.361) (0.353) (0.397) 
[0.543] [0.004] [0.021] [0.082] [0.281] 
       
CCE-Restricted/Efficient  1.301 -0.577 -0.686 -0.588 -0.596 
(0.059) (0.146) (0.159) (0.170) (0.175) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
 




B.  Corporate Income Tax Rate 
      “Old and New Capital” 
     
CCE-Unrestricted/Inefficient  0.951 -0.202 -0.142 -0.007 -0.090 
(0.338) (0.324) (0.387) (0.404) (0.410) 
[0.005] [0.533] [0.714] [0.987] [0.827] 
       
CCE-Restricted/Efficient  0.512 -0.004 -0.138 -0.077 -0.048 
(0.206) (0.182) (0.210) (0.192) (0.202) 
[0.013] [0.981] [0.513] [0.690] [0.813] 
   
        
 
Table Notes After Table 7   
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Table 5: 
Estimated Slope of Reaction Function For Each Tax Policy 
( = Sum of Coefficients on the  f
i,t  ’s) 
  




 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E) 
  Number of Time Lags for all regressors: 
 
 
  0 1 2 3 4 
A.  Investment Tax Credit Rate 
      “New Capital” 
     
Common Correlated Effects Pooled (CCE)  1.301 -1.271 -2.774 -1.779 -3.255 
(0.059) (0.144) (0.326) (0.157) (0.457) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       
Two-way Fixed Effects (TFE)  7.534 -1.173 -1.280 -1.282 -0.651 
(2.770) (0.452) (0.585) (0.588) (2.392) 
[0.007] [0.009] [0.029] [0.029] [0.786] 
       
One-way (state) fixed effects  1.670 0.527 0.513 0.591 0.400 
(0.180) (0.394) (0.378) (3.082) (0.429) 
[0.000] [0.181] [0.175] [0.848] [0.351] 










B.  Corporate Income Tax Rate 
      “Old and New Capital” 
   
 
 
Common Correlated Effects Pooled (CCE)  0.512 -0.118 -0.308 -0.134 -2.195 
(0.206) (0.274) (0.317) (0.290) (0.349) 
[0.013] [0.668] [0.331] [0.644] [0.000] 
       
Two-way Fixed Effects (TFE)  1.418 1.207 0.749 0.384 0.275 
(0.172) (0.988) (0.879) (0.830) (0.457) 
[0.000] [0.222] [0.395] [0.643] [0.000] 
       
One-way (state) fixed effects  1.030 0.686 0.489 0.484 0.322 
(0.133) (0.200) (0.192) (0.301) (0.419) 
[0.000] [0.001] [0.011] [0.107] [0.443] 
 
Table Notes After Table 7  
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Table 6 
Estimated Slope of Reaction Function For Each Tax Policy 
( = Sum of Coefficients on the  f
i,t  ’s) 
Various OLS Estimators and Time Lags of Tax Competition Variable 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E) 
  Number of Time Lags of  f
i,t  : 
  0 1  2  3  4 
A.  Investment Tax Credit Rate 
      “New Capital” 
        
Common Correlated Effects Pooled (CCE)  -0.807 -0.722  -0.695  -0.742  -0.737 
(0.070) (0.070)  (0.072)  (0.077)  (0.082) 
[0.000] [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
       
Two-way Fixed Effects (TFE)  -1.344 -1.367  -1.474  -1.584  -1.709 
(0.250) (0.233)  (0.236)  (0.238)  (0.252) 
[0.000] [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
        
One-way (state) fixed effects  0.266 0.259  0.240  0.222  0.204 
(0.113) (0.114)  (0.124)  (0.134)  (0.146) 





    
B.  Corporate Income Tax Rate 
      “Old and New Capital” 
        
Common Correlated Effects Pooled (CCE)  -0.630 -0.502  -0.362  -0.249  -0.238 
(0.185) (0.144)  (0.139)  (0.142)  (0.147) 
[0.001] [0.001]  [0.009]  [0.079]  [0.106] 
          
Two-way Fixed Effects (TFE)  -1.647 -1.608  -1.584  -1.604  -1.578 
(0.579) (0.593)  (0.603)  (0.600)  (0.597) 
[0.005] [0.007]  [0.009]  [0.008]  [0.008] 
        
One-way (state) fixed effects  0.433 0.392  0.330  0.277  0.267 
(0.111) (0.124)  (0.156)  (0.174)  (0.175) 
[0.000] [0.002]  [0.034]  [0.112]  [0.128] 
 
Table Notes After Table 7  
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Table 7   
Estimated Slope of Reaction Function For Alternative Tax Policy Measures 
( = Sum of Coefficients on the  f
i,t  ’s) 
Various IV Estimators and Time Lags of Tax Competition Variable 
  Number of Time Lags of  f
i,t  : 
  0 1 2 3 4 
A.  Tax Wedge On Capital       
Common Correlated Effects Pooled (CCE)  1.062 -1.356 -1.352 -1.371 -1.430 
(0.064) (0.156) (0.160) (0.164) (0.161) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       
 
Two-way Fixed Effects (TFE) 
1.288 -1.274 -1.326 -1.448 -1.551 
(4.644) (0.429) (0.461) (0.464) (0.503) 
[0.782] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] 
       
 
One-way (state) fixed effects 
1.321 1.021 1.131 1.125 1.124 
(0.158) (0.787) (0.811) (0.740) (0.751) 
[0.000] [0.195] [0.163] [0.129] [0.135] 
       
B.  Average Corporate Tax Rate       
Common Correlated Effects Pooled (CCE)  1.103 -0.569 -0.440 2.267 2.287 
  (0.039) (0.196) (0.243) (0.144) (0.122) 
  [0.000] [0.004] [0.070] [0.000] [0.000] 
       
Two-way Fixed Effects (TFE)  2.484 0.801 0.939 0.942 0.945 
  (0.128) (0.509) (0.357) (0.404) (0.403) 
  [0.000] [0.116] [0.009] [0.020] [0.019] 
       
One-way (state) fixed effects  0.919 1.049 1.089 1.108 1.116 
  (0.107) (0.052) (0.072) (0.082) (0.084) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       
C.  Capital Apportionment Weight       
Common Correlated Effects Pooled (CCE)  1.904 -2.045 -2.126 -2.209 -2.333 
  (0.075) (0.064) (0.067) (0.064) (0.063) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       
Two-way Fixed Effects (TFE)  2.089 -3.718 -3.825 -3.955 -4.131 
  (1.239) (0.250) (0.263) (0.294) (0.282) 
  [0.092] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
        
One-way (state) fixed effects  0.942 0.297 0.317 0.337 0.359 
  (0.209) (0.077) (0.077) (0.074) (0.071) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
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Notes To The Tables:    
Instrumental variable (IV) estimates are based on equation (21) (except for the 
unrestricted/inefficient  estimates in Table 4) and panel data for 48 states for the period 1965 to 
2006.  Given the maximum of four time lags, the effective sample is for the period 1969 to 2006.  
To enhance comparability across models, the 1969 to 2006 sample is used for all estimates.  
Some of the tables differ with respect to the tax variables appearing as dependent and 
independent variables.  The foreign states tax variable ( f
i,t n, n 0,...,4   ) is defined in equation 
(15) as the spatial lag of the home state tax variable, i,t  .  The competitive set of states is defined 
by all states other than state i, and the spatial lag weights are the inverse of the distance between 
the population centroids for state i and that of a foreign state, normalized to sum to unity.  There 
are three control variables:   i,t 1 PREFERENCES   captures the political preferences of the state.  
This variable is the average of three indicator variables, is lagged one period to avoid 
endogeneity issues, and ranges from 0.0 to 1.0.  The three indicator variables are (a) the political 
party of the governor (1 if Republican; 0 otherwise), (b) the political party controlling both 
houses of the legislature (1 if Republican; 0 otherwise), and (c) an interaction between the 
indicator variables defined in (a) and (b).   i,t 1 IK   is the investment to capital ratio, lagged one 
period to avoid endogeneity issues.   i,t POPULATION  is the state population as measured by the 
U.S. Census Bureau.  The CCE estimator requires cross-section averages (CSA) of the dependent 
and independent variables as additional regressors; see Section III for details.  To account for the 
endogeneity of  f
i,t  , we project this variable against a set of instruments (except for the OLS 
estimates in Table 6) whose selection is discussed in Section III.C.  See Section IV and 
Appendix A for further details about definitions and data sources for the model variables.  
Instrument validity is assessed in terms of the Hansen J statistic based on the overidentifying 
restrictions.  The null hypothesis of instrument validity is assessed in terms of the p-values 
presented in the table.  A p-value greater than an arbitrary critical value (e.g., 0.10) implies that 
the null hypothesis is sustained and that the instruments are not invalid.  Instrument relevance is 
assessed in terms of the minimum eigenvalue statistic (similar to a 1
st-Stage F-statistic) assessing 
the joint significance of the excluded instruments from the projection of  f
i,t   on the included (i.e., 
control variables) and excluded instruments.  The α parameter measures the slope of the reaction 
function ( i,t   vs.  f
i,t n, n 0,...,4   ) and is the sum of the coefficients on the included  f
i,t n    
variable(s).  Standard errors for the CCE estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering 
by year.   
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Figure 1.  State Investment Tax Credit Rates 
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Average Credit Rate (line)  Number of States with Tax Credit (Bars)
 
 
Notes to Figure 1:  The number of states with an investment tax credit is indicated on the left 
vertical axis; the average credit rate (an unweighted average across only states with a credit) is 
indicated on the right vertical axis. The figure is drawn for all 50 states and excludes the District 
of Columbia.  See Appendix B for details concerning the construction of the variables.   
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Figure 2.  National Averages Of State Investment Tax Credit  
                      And Corporate Income Tax Rates 








































Corporate Income Tax Rate (left axis)




Notes to Figure 2:  Averages are calculated over all 50 states (unweighted) and exclude the 
District of Columbia. Both rates are measured by the top marginal rate.  See Appendix B for 
details concerning the construction of the variables.   
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Figure 3.  National Average Of State Tax Wedge On Capital  






































Notes to Figure 3:  Averages are calculated over all 50 states (unweighted) and exclude the 
District of Columbia.  See footnote 1 and Appendix B for details concerning the construction of 
the variable.     
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Figure 4.  National Averages Of Capital Apportionment Weight  
                     And Average Corporate Tax Rate 









































Capital Apportionment Weight (right axis)
Average Corporate Tax Rate (left axis)
 
 
Notes to Figure 4:  Averages are calculated over all 50 states (unweighted) and exclude the 
District of Columbia.  See Appendix B for details concerning the construction of the capital 
apportionment weight variable.  The average corporate tax rate variable is the ratio of state tax 
revenues from corporate taxes, severance taxes, and license fees to total state business income, 
the latter measured by gross operating surplus.  
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Notes to Figure 5:  This figure plots the theoretical slope of the reaction function (equation (14)) 
on the vertical axis against values of  ,y    ranging from -2.00 to +2.00 in increments of 0.10 on 
the horizontal axis.  These computations are based on the following assumptions:  
y,k 0.33,  k, 1.00,     and  3.5   (the latter figure is the approximate ratio of consumption 
to total government spending (federal, state, and local) from the National Income and Product 
Accounts).  Figure 5 is based on the assumption that  f 0   .  The shape of the figure is 
insensitive to variations in  f   and  . 
 
   